

Binding Office

The Department of State

bulletin

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The Principal Ingredients of U.S. Foreign Policy

by *Adrian S. Fisher*
*Legal Adviser*¹

When a person whose daily concern is world affairs and American foreign policy gets up before an audience, he is often strongly tempted to be cosmic. This evening I will do my best to resist this temptation and I will try to avoid others which seem to beset people in my line of work.

I have a reason for doing so. In the situation that we now face and which will probably be with us for some years to come, the cosmic approach is not suitable. There is no denying that world affairs are now in a crisis stage. It is therefore possible to argue that the year 1952 is a year of decision.

What happens in Europe to give it a unity it has never known and one which is probably essential to the survival of the continent; what happens in Asia to keep it from being swallowed up by Communist imperialism; what happens behind the Iron Curtain to hamper and disturb the Kremlin; what happens in the Middle East and Africa to keep that area from being the booster charge which detonates a global explosion—all these and other sources of confusion and alarm will have to be faced up to this year to save civilization, or else we condemn it to continued attrition from the enemies of mankind.

Nevertheless, these and the other ingredients of the crisis which now engages us appear to have a potential staying power which could carry them into 1953. Therefore it is by no means impossible that a year hence we could also term 1953 a year of decision. It is also conceivable that the same might be said of 1954.

My purpose in making this point is not to paint you a picture of unrelieved gloom. I think at the moment that an attitude of cautious optimism can be justified. I am making the point because I believe it important that we recognize the distinct possibility that this crisis, or major elements of it, may be with us for some time. If this is recognized, the belief that all that is needed is a single burst of effort is clearly in error. We must gear our plans and prepare ourselves for a steady and

sustained effort, one that is pursued with all the determination and single-mindedness that we can muster.

Factors in the Prevention of Global War

I am not of the opinion that a global war is just around the corner or that such a conflict is inevitable. Moreover, it is my private conviction that the problem of peace and war, in the traditional sense, does not confront us. I have reached this opinion from what we have seen of Soviet tactics and from the deductions we can make as to Soviet strategy. The Communists seem to be set on a course which is just short of total war. I believe that we can look for them to pursue this course until the Soviet leadership is driven to the conclusion that it can get them nowhere.

The Kremlin will be driven to this conclusion only if America and her friends meet the grueling test of patience and firmness to which they will be indefinitely subjected. This constitutes a challenge which is without precedent in our own experience and perhaps in the history of any modern nation.

Patience is not an American characteristic. We are not by our own free choice inclined to gradualism. Our disposition is to do things in a hurry, to get in and get it over with. Under current conditions, if we forget ourselves and indulge our native preference we risk disaster. For the sake of all that we hold dear we must learn to take the long view—particularly if a refusal to do so is to fly in the face of every dictate of common sense.

The factors underlying this requirement can be simply stated.

We want peace—honorable peace—but peace as the best hope of man.

We recognize that in a real sense there may be no such thing as victory in a war which counts nuclear fission among its weapons. At the same time, we are aware that we must build our defenses if we hope to discourage an aggressor or defend against an attack.

We know that wisdom demands that we lead from courage rather than fear, and from calculated strength rather than anger. We cannot af-

¹ Address made before the Roosevelt Day Dinner of the Americans for Democratic Action at Chicago, Ill., on Jan. 31 and released to the press on the same date.

ford the luxury of flying off the handle. We cannot afford the luxury of fondling our prejudices.

We must further set ourselves to squeeze the last drop of benefit from our experiences in the last 30 years.

Stilling the Voices of Isolationism

For example, when I hear certain voices that are now loud in the land and which cry the doctrine of a new model isolationism—a sort of hydromantic version of the tragic error that seized us during the twenties, and even during the thirties, I wonder whether some of us ever learn. I cannot help thinking that if we had not reneged on joining the League of Nations, Hitler might never have gained power and the Second World War might not have occurred.

Even after the yoke of fascism was fastened on Germany and Italy, America could still have made its influence felt. So well indoctrinated were some Americans in the specious philosophy of isolationism and self-sufficiency that when President Roosevelt made his quarantine speech in 1937, he found that public opinion withheld support for active measures against totalitarianism.

As the clouds of war gathered and darkened, we did take measures such as the destroyer-for-bases deal to help the side to which we belonged. But we did not recognize that we were irrevocably committed until the Japanese struck Pearl Harbor and we found ourselves automatically at war.

Until recently it seemed that among other things, the bombs that blasted Pearl Harbor also destroyed the spell of isolationism which had previously held us in its thrall. But if I read correctly the drift in certain quarters this impression would appear incorrect. The rebuilt model of the “we can go it alone” concept has been streamlined a bit, and to some degree updated. But these modifications cannot hide the fact that it is essentially the same old isolation which holds the same perils for the future of the United States.

During World War II and after it, the United States adopted a policy which held that peace was best secured through collective security. Fundamentally, this policy accepted the thesis that world peace could not be broken down into compartments, that a threat to peace in one region was a threat to the peace of all regions. In practical terms the immediate application of that policy called for the United States to shoulder the burden of world leadership which had been thrust upon it and to join with other nations who valued liberty in immunizing the free world against Soviet encroachment. This was indicated in the simple interest of saving our own necks. And now at a crucial stage in putting this policy across when perhaps for the first time we can see the outlines of success on the horizon, some groups in this country are actually suggesting retreat.

This tactic denies all the lessons of the past and breeds doubt and terror throughout the free world.

We have heard further outcries recently against our efforts to fight aggression in Korea. We might have washed our hands of Korea, but what would have been the result? Instead of being halted in its tracks, Communist aggression might by now have made a clean sweep of southeast Asia. Indochina, Malaya, Burma could not have withstood the tide. These countries are not yet free of threat, but if we had not taken our stand in Korea, they might have been engulfed long months ago.

If we had failed to match the challenge in Korea, much that has been done to strengthen the non-Soviet world against Communist imperialism would have remained undone. Our own Nation would not have mobilized, Western Europe would not have gone so far to protect itself, we would not at this hour be occupying a staunch position against all eventualities, critics of our foreign policy would have urgent reason to talk about our “survival,” instead of exploiting the possibility of our going under as the small change of campaign chatter.

Our action in Korea was unavoidable, if the Truman Doctrine with reference to Greece and Turkey meant anything. When we undertook in southeast Europe to halt Communist penetration, the great majority of Americans understood and approved the step. When we undertook to halt Communist penetration in Korea, most Americans understood and approved. In the one instance, we saved Greece and Turkey from the jaws of the Russian bear. In the other instance, we upset his program, notified him that he could trespass only at his peril, instilled threatened peoples with a fresh courage, and gave ourselves an opportunity to gird our loins.

That may seem to be the wrong course to some people, but in terms of our own interest and the well-being of mankind, it is the only thing we could have done without taking a risk greater than anything the Korean intervention has cost us. It is tragic that so many lives and so much treasure had to be expended, but this sacrifice is beyond being cheapened by partisan attacks. There is a logic of justice and right, which sometimes has to be expressed in terms of force. That is the logic of Korea, and whoever denies it denies the best in our American heritage and consigns the rest of the free world to chaos and the long night.

The Faith of Our Fathers

The men who wrote our Constitution and set the feet of this Republic on the road to greatness had a lively sense of the example the United States was setting. From his retirement, James Madison wrote to a friend:

The free system of government we have established is so congenial with reason, with common sense, and with

a universal feeling, that it must produce approbation. . . . Our country, if it does justice to itself, will be the workshop of liberty to the civilized world, and do more than any other for the uncivilized.

That phrase, "workshop of liberty," is projected in twentieth-century terms by our present foreign policy. We have through trial and error, through adversity mixed with hard work and good fortune managed to reach a plateau of freedom from which we can view the posture of world affairs through the wisdom gained by our own experience. Our fortunate situation and what we have learned along the hard road that brought us to it imposes upon us an obligation to the rest of mankind. That obligation requires us to do what we can to help them to a similar position. This is not as unselfish as it appears on the surface. We have learned that we cannot live unto ourselves alone. We realize that insofar as we are concerned our freedom cannot be preserved if the freedom of other nations is snuffed out.

This is the essence of the American idea and is the wellspring of the enormous vitality which has enabled the United States to surmount every emergency which it has encountered and continue to grow and prosper. Yet, it is an idea which those who demand that we abandon Korea and get out of Europe categorically reject.

President Monroe's definition of our role in world affairs aptly sums up that combination of idealism and practicality which has served us so well in the past and which will guarantee our future welfare. Our domestic critics are fond of reproaching America for moralizing in the field of foreign policy. I contend that our national interest is best looked after when we are guided by the fusion of moral values and practical consideration. Those who discuss power politics as though it were something removed and separate from the things we live by spiritually seem to me to be at odds with all that has made America what it is today.

Application of the Policy of Containment

In terms of our present objectives, the moral values as well as the material are essential to success. We are engaging at this moment in a determined struggle to contain communism and to prevent its poison spreading into new areas. This effort at containment involves military, economic, and political reconstruction in areas endangered by the Soviet drive. In toto it is the negative phase of U.S. policy. It includes the situations of strength which we are building in Western Europe, at key points in the Mediterranean, in the Middle East, and in the Far East. It is based on three major premises. These premises are of equal importance and are completely interdependent. The Soviet Union bases its foreign policy to a very large degree on the harsh fact of military power. Therefore, if a nation or a group of nations is to stand up to Moscow or deal with

Stalin with any semblance of parity, that nation or group of nations must be able to call upon sufficient military strength to command the respect of the Kremlin.

As long as the appeal of communism is strongest in areas where there is hardship and want, that appeal must be combated by an improved standard of living so that a man's work produces the necessities of life and perhaps a few luxuries as well.

Finally, as long as communism depends on robbing a person of his faith in the future of the free world and on creating social chaos and confusion, that tactic must be countered by building the individual's confidence in his ability to manage his own affairs and by instilling in him the will to resist Soviet encroachment.

The foregoing summary will serve our purpose here, although it involves some oversimplification and—insofar as it labels the last two premises as merely negative—is inaccurate. Obviously, economic and social rehabilitation have important positive facets.

In applying this policy of containment, the Government of the United States embarked on a series of moves which are unequalled for boldness and imagination in this country's history. Although it is practically forgotten in the present emergency, the interim-aid program, a forerunner of the Marshall Plan, was instrumental in checking a Communist threat in both Italy and France. Shortly thereafter, Greece and Turkey were gravely menaced by Soviet pressure. Greece had to contend with a Communist-instigated revolt within its own borders and at the same time refused to be cowed by the sabre rattling of Soviet puppets across its borders. Because of threatened Soviet moves against its northern provinces, Turkey was maintaining a military force on a scale far beyond the power of the nation's economy to sustain.

THE TRUMAN DOCTRINE: MILITARY AND ECONOMIC AID

The United States responded with the Truman Doctrine of combined military and economic aid. The success of this action is now a matter of history. The Greek revolt was crushed and the present Government is far stronger than the earlier regime. Turkey is a stable and determined friend in a highly strategic area.

I do not think I need to do more than remind you of the Marshall Plan and its great effectiveness in aiding the reconstruction of Western Europe. There were other steps taken to give needed economic assistance to friendly free nations in southeast Asia and in the Pacific area which were effective in checking internal Communist threats and in strengthening and stabilizing the governments concerned.

When then Secretary of State Marshall launched the program, now known by his name, at Harvard University in June 1947, he identified its purpose

as "the revival of a working economy in the world so as to permit the emergence of political and social conditions in which the free institutions can exist." To a considerable degree this purpose has been achieved.

Despite a reluctance on the part of the free nations to again engage in raising a military force, realism required that all hands take into account the potential menace of the Red army and the Kremlin's habit of using its military force as a blackjack in dealing with other nations. Plain common sense dictated that defenses be erected. If the underlying principle of collective security—a joint defense based on self-help and mutual aid—was to be applied, a political framework had first to be put together. This framework was developed through the regional defense agreements exemplified by the Organization of American States, the North Atlantic Pact, the proposed Federated Command for the Middle East, and the Pacific security arrangements.

To give the initial impetus to these defense agreements, the United States launched the U.S. Mutual Defense Assistance Program and followed up with the combined economic and military aid which is now going forward under the Mutual Security Program.

With these provisions for the setting up of a defensive shield which would deter Communist aggression and make impossible the bargain-basement conquest so dear to their hearts what might be called the holding aspect of American policy is rounded off. But in terms of what Monroe described as a "workshop of liberty" it is only a part of the necessary program.

There must be essential positive factors which meet the challenge of communism and demonstrate the immeasurably greater values of freedom and democracy. A part of this program is economic in nature, but the type of assistance that we were able to offer through the Marshall Plan does not suffice. The Marshall Plan and kindred programs were intended mainly for economically advanced countries and peoples victimized by war; countries with economies which had once been staunch, people who had known prosperity, enjoyed political and social stability, pursued the arts of successful living.

POINT FOUR: ASSISTANCE TO THE UNDERDEVELOPED AREAS

But what about that vast multitude who belong to an entirely different category, the underprivileged billions who for one reason or another have never been emancipated from poverty, disease, and ignorance, the men and women of the world who fit Edwin Markham's line from the "Man With the Hoe": "Humanity betrayed, plundered, profaned, and disinherited." I direct your attention to the concluding stanza of that poem:

O masters, lords and rulers in all lands,
How will the future reckon with this man?
How answer his brute question in that hour
When whirlwinds of rebellion shake all shores?

These whirlwinds of revolt are shaking the shores and hinterland of Asia and Africa. Nationalism is giving a special edge to the long frustration of the past. How are we to deal with this ferment? We cannot afford to be indifferent to it. We can be sure the Communists are not indifferent. The people of underdeveloped areas are meat and wine for the Commies—not because the poor devils yearn for Stalin but because the promises of Stalinism offer at least the appearance of an escape from the wrongs and sorrows of their existence.

Only a few days ago, Secretary Acheson spoke on this very point. He said:

It is the juncture of . . . revolutionary forces in the underdeveloped areas of the world that gives meaning to the Point Four Program. For the new technology gives us not only the instruments of a better life, but also the means of mass communication and education by which to transmit this knowledge. And if, in so doing, we can help people not only to develop the soil, the water, and the resources of their lands, but to develop the culture that suits them and fits their needs, and to fulfill their aspirations for responsible and more representative government—then these revolutionary forces can be constructively channeled and contribute to the peace of the world. If not, the world will continue to be swept by the rip tides of conflict.²

In proposing the Point Four Program, President Truman called for democracy to attack those ancient tyrants, "hunger, misery, and despair." That call has not yet been fully heeded. But even a year and a half of limited effort has already revealed a feasible way of extricating helpless human beings from the fell clutch of circumstance. Already our specialists and experts working at the grass-roots level have shown that they can clear the way to a new earth for forgotten men and women. And this is possible without any great outlay of money, without imposing our will on anyone, merely through combining technical knowledge with a certain missionary zeal to help people help themselves.

All this may sound like typical American sentimentality to people who pride themselves on being realists. But it is actually hard common sense—at once short-range and in a large frame of reference. There was a day when, for one reason or another, the state of underdeveloped areas of the world was one of "innocuous desuetude." But there is nothing innocuous in the forlorn status of teeming millions in unadvanced areas. In many areas their condition has been transformed into a churning flood eating away at the ordered life of the world. The choice before us is between trying to meet this challenge and leaving it to work its will upon the foundations of civilization.

Point Four is a peculiarly constructive phase of that great mission to which the United States has been called—to "bring peace and safety to all nations and make the world itself at last free." In the light of that service, what becomes of the argu-

² BULLETIN of Feb. 4, 1952, p. 157.

ments of those who urge that we set up a Fortress America and reconsider a foreign policy replete with global obligations? It is profoundly depressing that, at this late hour, we now hear demands that we retire from the field in utter disregard to the fact that, as one of the trustees of civilization, America would thereby be betraying itself and the rest of mankind.

THE CAMPAIGN OF TRUTH

In practical terms the debate over these issues goes deeper than the question of this country's course in world affairs. Like it or not, we are locked in a struggle for the minds of men. The outcome of this struggle will determine whether or not men shall remain masters of their individual destinies or shall become the pawns of totalitarianism.

At this moment the heavy artillery that the United States can bring to bear is that which fires ideas. In a manner of speaking, the American guns are transmitters, moving pictures, and the printed matter which carry the news and the ideas that are components of the Campaign of Truth. In popular terms we are speaking of the propaganda that is beamed through the Iron Curtain, but we are not dealing in propaganda as such. We are dealing in the facts of American life and telling the story of the ways of men in societies where men are free. We are thus striking at the soft spot in the monolith of communism. The Iron Curtain was dropped to prevent the penetration of these ideas because they constitute the one area where rigid Soviet controls cannot be applied.

The Soviet Union has built jamming mechanisms by the hundreds in a vain attempt to silence the Voice of America, but despite this all-out effort, we know that we are getting through to the satellites and to the Russian people. We know also that pictures and printed material, detailing the differences between a life in the West and life in the Kremlin, have reached areas in the Soviet sphere. Testimony to the impact that this material is having on the subject peoples is provided by the strenuous Soviet methods to keep it out. Every month, this drive to reach into the heart of Soviet territory with the facts and the ideas that unmask communism, and its betrayal of human dignity, is increased. A few weeks ago "Operation Vagabond" was launched. I say launched because the *Vagabond* is a ship, or more accurately, a floating transmitter which will cruise the seas off Soviet shores and provide a mobile barrage for the news-starved subjects of the Politburo.

We believe the injunction, "Know the truth and the truth shall set ye free." And we are doing all in our power to help the people of the Soviet Union know it.

THE UNITED NATIONS

A third element in the free world counteroffensive is the United Nations organization. Here we have a force for peace which has gained steadily in strength and effectiveness since its inception. In its beginnings it provided the conference table over which international disputes could be settled without resort to force. It was also a highly effective form for the airing of differences between nations so that world opinion could gain an unprejudiced evaluation of the rights and wrongs of a particular issue. In June of 1950 the United Nations matured. Confronted with a flagrant breach of peace, the representatives of 54 nations joined forces to condemn the aggression and then urged the membership to meet force with force. The membership responded, and as a result, for the first time in the history of the modern world, troops of nearly a score of nations are fighting to beat back an aggression and preserve peace.

It is conceded that all participants in this action have not contributed the maximum according to their capacity. That is something which the United States is doing everything in its power to remedy. But it is not as important as the implications of the action itself. In its true meaning the Korean move signifies that the principle of collective security has been translated into an actuality. That in itself is an accomplishment of huge proportions.

The point we have now reached recalls a situation which prevailed more than 30 years ago when another debate involving the similar issue of American leadership and support for an international organization was raging.

On this occasion Woodrow Wilson said:

The world outside of America is asking itself the question "Is America going to stand by us now, or is it at this moment of final crisis going to draw apart and desert us?" I can answer this question here and now. It is not going to draw apart and it is not going to desert the nations of the world. America responds to nothing so quickly or unanimously as a great moral challenge. It is much more ready to carry through what now lies before it than it was even to carry through what was before it when we took up arms in behalf of the freedom of the world.

But Wilson's affirmation of faith came too soon. The bitter-enders in the Senate played upon popular lethargy, and our country rejected the role of leadership. It took a depression and another World War to drive home to the American people a full realization of the part they had to play. But, by then, what would have been relatively simple had grown formidably complicated. A new factor had been injected into the international equation. Soviet imperialism had emerged to bedevil the situation. Now nothing could be tried or done without having to contend with the ruthless, unpredictable hostility of Moscow.

I believe that Wilson's declaration of faith is now being redeemed. I feel that in the marrow

of their bones the American people know that what we are testing is the validity and strength, and the endurance of the principles of American democracy against the dogma of communism.

I feel, also, that in the marrow of their bones the American people are determined that the way of life which they represent will be the one which will endure.

Death of King George VI

Statement by the President

[Released to the press by the White House February 6]

A world personage who maintained the highest traditions of the English constitutional monarchy passes in the death of His Majesty King George VI.

From his accession to the throne through all the ills which beset the world throughout the years of his reign—including the most disastrous war in history—he played his part nobly and with full understanding of the responsibility which was his. His heroic endurance of pain and suffering during these past few years is a true reflection of the bravery of the British people in adversity.

The King was ever conscious of his obligations as sovereign of a nation which through centuries has been the champion of personal liberty and those free institutions which ruthless dictators despise. He shared to the end of his reign all the hardships and austerities which evil days imposed on the brave British people. In return he received from the people of the whole Commonwealth a love and devotion which went beyond the usual relationship of a King and his subjects. This relationship flowed from the kindness of the King's heart and his complete dedication to those he both ruled and served.

The visit of the late King and his gracious Queen to this country heightened the good relations between our two peoples. Then there followed the visit last year of Her Royal Highness, now Queen Elizabeth II. It is a commentary on present day democracy that the daughters of the King of England and the President of the United States could exchange visits on a basis of friendship and mutual understanding and good will.

My deepest sympathy goes out to the British people. God bless Queen Elizabeth and may her father's exemplary memory provide the courage and inspiration she will need in the great responsibilities that lie before her.

Press Conference Statement by Secretary Acheson

[Released to the press February 6]

We learned this morning with profound sorrow of the death of His Majesty King George VI.

The loss to his subjects is great. The American people, so long bound by close ties of friendship to Great Britain and the Commonwealth, sympathize in their loss. During his reign Great Britain endured the most perilous and trying times in her history, and throughout her ordeal he worked unceasingly and unsparingly for his country and his people. The courage with which he bore his own suffering in the last years was a symbol of his indomitable spirit. It is a characteristic English spirit and the King possessed it in abundance.

The President has expressed for all of us our deepest sympathy to the Royal Family and to the British people.

May God bless the young Queen and grant her the strength and wisdom to fulfill her high responsibilities as her father did before her. May her reign be long and her peoples prosper throughout it.

Admiral McCormick Designated Commander of NATO Naval Forces

[Released to the press by the White House January 30]

The President on January 30 sent the following letter to Admiral Lynde D. McCormick, U.S.N.:

MY DEAR ADMIRAL MCCORMICK: The North Atlantic Treaty Nations have agreed that a Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic, should now be appointed and have requested that I designate a United States officer. I have designated you for this new international command which embraces a large area under the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

I am informed that the Standing Group of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization will issue a directive to you concerning your responsibilities and authority as the Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic.

You are hereby assigned operational command, of the United States Armed Forces assigned to the U.S. Atlantic Command, to the extent necessary for the accomplishment of your mission.

You are hereby authorized to use officers and enlisted personnel of the U.S. Armed Forces and civilian employees of the U.S. Government, on your staff as you consider appropriate in numbers and grades as necessary.

I am sending copies of this letter to the Secretary of State and to the Secretary of Defense for their guidance.

Sincerely yours,

HARRY S. TRUMAN

Department of State Bulletin

VOA's Counterattack on the Siren Voice of Moscow

by Edwin M. J. Kretzmann

Policy Adviser, Officer of International Broadcasting¹

In a few weeks the Voice of America will celebrate the tenth anniversary of its first broadcast, born of wartime necessity. Many of the people who took part in that event are still members of the staff and the experience they have accumulated and passed on to the newer members of the staff is unique and invaluable. To this has been added the professional and technical experience of American radio and many outstanding experts in the field of foreign affairs.

To all these factors must be added one more very important element—the correct evaluation of the misunderstandings and deliberate distortions which are current abroad about the United States and its foreign-policy objectives. The study of this background necessitates continuing analysis of all material emanating from the Kremlin and its world-wide network of agents—the Communist parties of all countries. It also requires sympathetic understanding of the things that are bothering our friends and allies in the free world. We would be remiss in discharging our duty to you if we failed to take these factors into account in tailoring our output to achieve the maximum result.

All this adds up to the fact that into every broadcast, pamphlet, or film must go a sober appraisal of our own strength and weakness, appreciation of the likes and dislikes of our audience, and a full realization of the nature and singleness of purpose of our sworn adversary—the men in the Kremlin. It is abundantly clear by now that to these men only one thing matters—the preservation and extension of their power. To serve this end they have the vast and sinister apparatus of the Cominform devoted to blackening the motives and aims of the free world. They command the subversive activities of Communists everywhere whose first and only allegiance is to further the imperialistic aims of the Politburo. They spend from 10 to 20 times the amounts we do on propagating their perverted version of issues confronting the world today. But with all their efforts they have been unable to produce a single new and

challenging ideal to spearhead their campaign. Their entire stock in trade consists of stolen and traduced ideas—ideas once held in esteem by all aspiring men, but in their versions shamefully caricatured and skillfully disguised to substitute the form for the substance down to their ridiculously and mockingly redundant "Peoples' Democracies."

The U.S. Psychological Offense: A Tale of Three Cities

Seen against this background the United States achieved three major psychological victories during the year 1951—three victories, which like all victories, were built on a cumulative series of successes and must continue to be protected like all hard-fought gains. But for purposes of historical convenience we can link these three victories with three cities spanning three continents and arbitrarily assign three dates to mark the turning point of the tide. On March 19 at Santiago, Chile, the myth was exploded that the Soviet Union represents the workers' paradise. On September 3 at Geneva the fiction that communism's version of land reform, that ideal which attracts so much of the Asiatic world, really benefits the peasants and farmers, was laid to rest. And at Paris, on November 8, Mr. Vyshinsky's hysterical laughter in reaction to our introduction of genuine proposals for peace and disarmament marked the end of the Kremlin's crudest and most cynical hoax on mankind—the phony peace campaigns. This tale of three cities bears greater exposition since the events that led up to and followed these dates serve best to illustrate the bitter struggle which goes on continuously for men's minds and hearts.

Santiago, Chile: Discovery of the Soviet Slave Labor Force

When the United Nations Economic and Social Council voted on March 19, 1951, at Santiago, Chile, to hold a world-wide inquiry into the use of forced labor, over the vociferous objections of the Soviet Union, Poland, and Czechoslovakia, it represented the culmination of a long struggle on the

¹An article based on an address made before the Federation of Jewish Women's Organizations, New York, N.Y., on Jan. 16.

part of the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions to bring to the attention of the world the appalling and inhuman conditions in these slave-labor camps which are an integral part of the Soviet economy. The subject was first brought to the attention of the United Nations in 1949, but the Soviet Union blocked all efforts to launch an inquiry. Then followed the long and painful process of gathering the evidence, which was difficult because the Iron Curtain exists precisely to hide this sort of thing.

A spectacular development on the road to enlightenment was the Rousset trial in Paris. In November 1949 David Rousset proposed the creation of an impartial commission composed exclusively of former inmates of Nazi concentration camps to investigate slave labor wherever it might exist and, in particular, in the Soviet Union. The French writer was immediately villified by the Communist weekly *Lettres Françaises* and accused of forging his evidence relating to the Soviet Union. Rousset brought suit for libel. After many delays caused by the stalling tactics of the Communist defendants, the case was tried and Rousset produced victim after victim from many nations, most of them ex-Communists and Socialists, who produced irrefutable testimony of conditions in the slave-labor camps in what the Communists love to describe as the workers' paradise.

Rousset won his case and the Communists were forced to pay the libel charges and print the verdict in their press. Later Mr. Rousset aided in presenting a public hearing in Brussels which again fully exposed the existence and extent of the practice of slave labor in the Soviet Union. Although these stories were given little coverage by the American press, the Voice of America covered them in scores of scripts, did special recordings of the testimony in various languages, and generally megaphoned the trials to the world.

But documentary evidence was needed. This too was found, and the Voice is proud to have played a part in uncovering it. It was photostated and dramatically presented at Santiago by Miss Toni Sender of the American Federation of Labor. More evidence is now being accumulated, all tending to show that the Soviet Union maintains a slave-labor force of approximately 10 million people or more. In official Soviet documents these are designated as correctional camps for political recalcitrants, but the evidence on commitments points clearly to two motivations: one, economic, the most shameful exploitation of human labor by a regime which makes a fetish of freeing "workers in capitalist countries" from exploitation; and two, political, as a means of maintaining power by terror, which feeds upon itself and grows inexorably. We continue and will continue to expose hypocrisy and deception, but since March 19, 1951, at Santiago, Chile, the Soviet Union and its slavish imitators have gone on the defensive. It is our

business now to see that no one is deceived about the true economic and social conditions in the Kremlin's slave empire.

Geneva, Switzerland: Land Reform Program

Perhaps our tale of land reform should really be date-lined Tokyo, because it was there and in Korea that we demonstrated by deeds and not by slogans what genuine land reform can accomplish. It is one of the ironies of history that General MacArthur has never been given adequate credit for this accomplishment, but I can assure you that without the general's accomplishments there would have been no turning point at Geneva on September 3. The case of land reform illustrates also the distinctive difference, and, I think, the blessing of our propaganda—the deed must match the word. We have no Iron Curtain to conceal the disparities between actuality and our pretensions—we do have a free, inquiring press which trumpets to the world when injustice is done, or when Government officials go astray, and by the same token our propaganda can never be better than our policies. The profound reverse effect upon the shaping of our policies brought about the necessity of explaining and defending them in a world-wide information service, which has only begun to be felt.

In the case of land reform the happy marriage of policy and propaganda was there. During the 5 years from 1946 to 1951 in Japan over 3 million farmers received land, thus bringing about an important social and political reform. A similar and perhaps even more far-reaching reform was well on its way in Korea when interrupted by the assault of the North Korean Communists on June 25, 1950. To us in the United States, the concept of land reform may seem remote, but in the vast areas of Asia where the gap between the few wealthy landowners and the large dispossessed mass of peasants was a complete void, "land reform can mean the difference between explosive tensions and stability, between apathy and hope, between serfdom and citizenship" as America's representative Isador Lubin put it in Geneva.

The reality behind the Communist slogans has quite different objectives. Communists, too, have held out to the farmers and peasants the lure of land of his own as bait. Initially they gave it to him by forcibly expropriating it from others. The next step was to levy upon the temporarily blissful landowner so large a quantity of deliveries in kind or such heavy taxes that he soon found himself in worse bondage than before. And then he was collectivized and became a hopeless serf to the all-controlling government.

The Voice of America has been exposing the falsity of these Communist promises in literally hundreds of scripts and continues to do so today, but our major emphasis is now upon our own positive policy as it has been successfully demonstrated in Japan and Korea. Land reform was

first raised to the level of a foreign-policy objective in the speech by Mr. Acheson before the U.N. General Assembly at New York in September 1950,² but the full program was launched at Geneva on September 3, 1951, and since then another psychological advantage has passed from the hands of the Soviets to us.

Paris, France, and the Laughter of Vyshinsky

And now the last of the tales of three cities—the story of peace. Never before in the history of the world has a greater hoax been attempted on more people than the parade of peace petitions, peace committees and councils, and peace protestations which the Soviet Union has cynically exhibited in the last few years. In the face of the fact of its expansion by sheer military force in all areas of Eastern Europe, in the face of its provocative action in Iran, its attempted military subversion of Greece, its belligerent threats to Turkey, its engineered *coup* in Czechoslovakia under the shadow of the Red army, its sabrerattling in Berlin and Vienna, and its repudiation of a treaty with China to help its vassals seize power there, the Soviet Union chose to gamble that the world would rather believe its honeyed words than face the realities of recognizing the threat of this new imperialism.

No one so sincerely detests a "warmonger" as the invader who wishes to cross a border unopposed, or put his foot on a neighbor's neck without meeting resistance. The fighting begins only if the victim resists the invader. Otherwise the imperialist aggressor wages his war of conquest in what he calls a "peaceful" fashion. But something happened in Korea on June 25, 1950, that shocked the world into realizing that peace without freedom and justice is worse than death. A week before the North Korean Communists launched their invasion they proudly announced that more than half the population had signed the Stockholm Peace Petition, a fact which was duly noted and stressed in the Voice of America's first broadcast on the subject. And the behavior of the Soviet regime and of Mr. Malik soon and quite clearly demonstrated that peace in their concept meant submission.

That was the tocsin for the free world and it responded with a lift.

But as the months dragged on and the fighting in Korea stalemated, the looming burden of armament with its equally bleak prospects of a long, drawn-out armed truce or a show-down of military force as the only alternatives depressed the world again to the point where the siren voice of Moscow's propaganda again found an ear.

During this period the Voice of America and every other agency of the free world had been busy exposing the shame and hypocrisy of Moscow's peace pretensions. But it lacked the positive side, the hopeful alternative that showed a

way out of the dilemma. That came with the proposal of the United States, Britain, and France in Paris on November 7 to achieve a genuine disarmament. Mr. Vyshinsky's laughter was not the good-natured chuckle of a savant at the ineptitude of his opponent's proposal. It was rather the hysterical laugh of one who has his mask of peace stripped from his face and stands naked and foolish before his public. His subsequent tirades and fulminations bear out this theory. The latest session of the so-called World Peace Council in Vienna was by all accounts a desultory and disappointing affair. It is inconceivable that the Soviet Union can ever again make any headway with its peace propaganda unless it is prepared to accept in good faith at least some of the disarmament proposals.

But it is equally inconceivable that the men in the Kremlin can change their policy. Like Hitler they have become the victims of the forces they have unleashed. They know that in their own people and in the people they have enslaved through their puppet regimes they have created a force which will destroy them as surely as it destroyed Hitler and other tyrants before him. They know that fresh oppression produces greater resentment and unrest, the only answer to which in their system is the imposition of new and greater terror. And so the chain reaction will develop to its inevitable end.

Meantime the pretense of their propaganda will increasingly lose its effectiveness if we can continue to hold the spotlight upon it. A regime which in 33 years of conscious pretension to the social revolution has not been able to reach the level of social and economic well-being of some of the less highly developed countries—it has actually enslaved more men in concentration camps than the entire industrial working class in the Russia of 1917 that the Bolshevik seizure of power promised to free—this regime can scarcely pose as the prophet of a future better world unless all sources of true information are blacked out by neglect or indifference.

A great deal of our effort in the radio field—almost 40 percent of it—is devoted to reaching the people behind the Iron Curtain, where despite Soviet efforts to jam us out, we still penetrate as one of the few voices of uncontrolled information. To them we like to speak in terms of Franklin Delano Roosevelt's prayer for the United Nations:

Yet most of all, grant us brotherhood, not only for this day but for all years—a brotherhood not of words but of acts and deeds. We are all of us children of the earth—grant us that simple knowledge. If our brothers are oppressed, then we are oppressed. If they hunger, we hunger. If their freedom is taken away, our freedom is not secure. Grant us a common faith then man shall know bread and peace—that he shall know justice and righteousness, freedom and security, an equal opportunity and an equal chance to do his best, not only in our land but throughout the world.

² BULLETIN of Oct. 2, 1950, p. 523.

Campaign of Truth Intensifies Activity in Field of Religion

[Released to the press February 4]

As a part of this Government's Campaign of Truth, the United States now is intensifying its counteroffensive against Communist attacks on the moral and religious aspects of American life.

This was emphasized in a report to Congress which was made public on February 4 by the United States Advisory Commission on Educational Exchange.

In its sixth semiannual report to the Congress, the Commission pointed to its recommendation that stress be placed on developing "a community of purpose between ourselves and all peoples of the world who cherish moral and spiritual values so as to protect them."

The Department of State has reported to the Commission that through its information centers abroad, it is now conducting "the most effective presentation of the moral and religious aspects of American life through selected, balanced collections of U.S. publications which portray America's spiritual heritage and religious values in true perspective."

Included among the nearly 2 million books in the 165 U.S. information centers overseas are copies of the Bible and such periodicals as *Christian Century*, *Commonweal*, and *Commentary*.

In addition to materials issued by various religious faiths, the centers also offer such Government-prepared publications as *100 Things You Should Know About Communism in Religion and Tensions Within the Soviet Union* (which includes a section on Communist persecution of religious groups).

The Department reported to the Commission that approximately one percent of the materials in its information centers is now of a religious nature.

"A general balance is sought between Catholic, Protestant, and Jewish materials," the Department told the Commission and added that "publications of an extreme religious bias or of purely sectarian nature are not provided."

Because of this policy the Department said that "a certain handicap exists because there are a relatively limited number of publications available in this field which can be considered appropriate for inclusion in an official United States Government activity, and are also suitable for a foreign audience."

The Advisory Commission's report also reaffirmed a previous recommendation by the Commission that "public funds not be used for the exchange of professional religious workers, lay or ordained, for the purpose of engaging in pastoral, missionary, or other professional religious activities."

The report recommended, however, that "persons engaged in study, teaching, or research in religious fields should be considered eligible for grants financed from public funds and should be judged on the same basis as candidates in other professional fields, on a thoroughly impartial and nondiscriminating basis."

The Commission's report said that the Department of State had accepted the first of these recommendations and is giving "serious consideration" to the second.

The Advisory Commission on Educational Exchange is composed of five outstanding educators who are appointed by the President. It makes a continuing study of the Department of State's Educational Exchange Program and reports its recommendations and findings to the Secretary of State and Congress.

PUBLICATIONS

Recent Releases

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, Government Printing Office, Washington 25, D. C. Address requests direct to the Superintendent of Documents, except in the case of free publications, which may be obtained from the Department of State.

Launching the Campaign of Truth: First Phase. International Information and Cultural Series 19. Pub. 4375. 67 pp. Limited distribution.

Sixth Semiannual Report of the Secretary of State to Congress on the International Information and Educational Exchange Program July 1 to Dec. 31, 1950.

Permanent Third Member of the Italian-United States Conciliation Commission. Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2232. Pub. 4205. 5 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and Italy—Exchange of notes at Rome Feb. 12 and 13, 1951; entered into force Feb. 13, 1951.

Education: Cooperative Program in Panama. Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2234. Pub. 4207. 4 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and Panama—Signed at Panamá Sept. 22 and Oct. 10, 1950; entered into force Oct. 12, 1950.

Health and Sanitation: Cooperative Program in Venezuela. Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2242. Pub. 4223. 9 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and Venezuela—Signed at Caracas Mar. 6 and 15, 1951; entered into force Mar. 15, 1951.

Continued on page 257

Mobilizing Materials for Defense

by Winthrop G. Brown

Director, Office of International Materials Policy¹

Before Korea the United States was in a state of great prosperity. We were increasingly realizing the dream of ever-higher standards of living for all our people. We had high employment and rising national income and ever-increasing production of the vast variety of things our people want and know so well how to make.

In Europe, countries were rebuilding the destruction of war; increasing production way above prewar levels.

And in the less-developed countries of the world there was a tremendous drive for a higher standard of living for the masses of the people, for roads and power plants and factories and irrigation projects and farm equipment and clothing and sewing machines.

To produce all that goes into these vast national efforts takes tremendous quantities of raw materials—steel and copper and tin and wool, and all the rest.

All of this was good. It was, and still is, just what we want.

And then Korea brought home to us the ugly truth that had been apparent for a long time that all this fruitful process of peaceable development was threatened; that the only way to repel that threat was to develop in the free world a military strength formidable enough to deter any aggressor.

So we in the United States, and other friendly countries also, turned to the task of building planes and guns and tanks, of equipping armies, and of building the factories and power plants necessary to support them.

And this job takes raw materials, lots and lots and lots of them, so much that in some cases the demands of our military alone for some materials are more than the total free world supply.

Establishing Priorities and Controls

As a result, there just aren't enough materials to go around. We can't have all the guns we need and all the butter we would like to have. In consequence, we as a Nation have to make some hard

¹Excerpts from an address made before the Southwestern Savings and Loan Conference at Biloxi, Miss., on Jan. 30 and released to the press on the same date.

choices, to establish priorities, and to do without certain things.

We have to find out what is most needed, to see that these essentials are provided first, to see that necessary cuts in other uses are distributed fairly, to see that the essential needs of friendly countries are met, to increase the world supply of these materials as much as possible, and to do all this without skyrocketing prices.

This means controls. It means controls because that is the only way to make sure that scarce aluminum, for example, will be used in building bombers instead of making venetian blinds, or that scarce copper will go into plants to produce the power necessary to make aluminum and steel instead of into roofing. Voluntary arrangements can never do this job, if for no other reason than that the information needed to do it right can only be collected in one place, and that unless there is central enforcement the honest citizen who cooperates is at the mercy of the chiseler who doesn't.

Nobody likes controls; even the people who administer them. This may surprise you, but by and large it's true. Just take my own case, for example. Before Korea I was working to expand trade, to break down governmental obstacles to trade, to create conditions in the world in which private businessmen could do their business in their own way with the most free competition possible. Today I am working largely on controls, national and international, to see that they are fair, that materials are sent where they are most needed, and that controls are no more restrictive than necessary. It isn't nearly as pleasant a task. But it has to be done and done well, if we are to be able to get back to concentrating on more normal types of work.

Well, what is the Government doing about all this? How does it go about seeing that the infinitely complicated American economy is so adjusted that it will produce first things first and dispense with nonessentials?

First of all, we have to find out what is most needed. Direct defense requirements, of course, come first. The military submit their requirements for tanks and guns and planes and other kinds of equipment. Those requirements are then

translated into tons of steel and pounds of copper and nickel and other materials. These requirements have priority. Then we find out from people in industry and from Government agencies who work in the field what requirements will be for such things as railroads and civil aviation and for new factories and power plants necessary to support defense production. And we translate these railroad cars and airplanes and ships and factories and power lines and generators into tons of steel and pounds of other metals. And we look at the records and talk to industry and find out what the country's demands are for consumer goods of all kinds—automobiles and refrigerators and radios and furniture and housing—and translate those into materials. And we do the same for roads and schools and all the major items that the country uses.

And then, since in this interdependent world we cannot think of the United States alone, we try to find out the needs of other friendly countries that are dependent on us for their supplies of a great variety of items and materials and much of their military equipment.

And we add up the totals and compare them with the supply of each material that is likely to be available.

This is some job! You all know how tough it is to estimate materials requirements for a house or a school or an office building. Estimating requirements for the total needs of the United States and its allies, which is what Mr. Wilson and his colleagues in the Office of Defense Mobilization (ODM) have to do, is just that much more complicated.

And it takes lots of time and many pieces of paper and cooperation from businessmen all over the country. It is only the people who are going to use the materials who can tell how much they need and what they need it for. If they don't give the Government the information it asks, it won't know where the materials are really needed, or be able to plan for the necessary supply. Forms are a nuisance. Questionnaires are a plague. But they serve a purpose vital to all of us.

After adding up the total requirements, the Government has found that for most important materials the demand is much larger than the supply. Military needs have to be met first. The next step is to decide which other things are most necessary and which things we can most easily get along without. These decisions are normally made by ODM in consultation with the affected industries and they are normally carried out in ways that will allow the greatest flexibility to the people affected. For example, an industry may be limited to a percentage of its use in a previous base period. It would be free to use the amount that was available to it in any way it wished and in the manner that would cause the least dislocation to its business. Or the use of given materials might be prohibited entirely for

a lot of purposes for which substitutes are available. Or businessmen might be required to limit the inventories that they can keep, and so on.

In the three most important materials—steel, copper and aluminum—the control is almost absolute. No one can use any of these materials except for an approved use.

This procedure would be difficult enough if it were simply a question of distributing available quantities of particular materials. But there is another factor in the picture that is just as important to the individual businessman as the amount of the material that he is going to get, and that is the question of when he gets it. I am sure many of you must be familiar with the experience of having a building or other project well under way, having your workmen on the job, and all your materials and equipment ready except for one vital element, the lack of which holds up the whole project. It won't do any good, for example, to build a new steel mill if we don't have the power to supply it or the wire necessary to bring the power into the plant. Therefore, when the program for allocation of each commodity is worked out, it has to be fitted into other programs to be sure that the flow of materials into industry is balanced as well as adequate.

You have to do this for each job you undertake. Washington has to do it for all of the jobs being undertaken by everybody all over the country.

Problems of Procurement

So much for the problem of putting the materials we have to work. The other side of the picture, that of actually getting the materials themselves, is just about as complicated.

Contrary to popular impression, the United States is a "have-not" nation in most of the raw materials most vital to defense production. Of the roughly 70 so-called "critical and strategic" materials we are nearly self-sufficient in only 7. We produce only a part of our normal needs in 24. We don't produce any of 35. Someone once estimated that it takes 31 different countries to produce the materials needed to make a modern automobile.

Our copper comes not only from home but from Chile, Canada, Mexico, Peru and Africa; wool from Australia and New Zealand; cobalt from the Belgian Congo and Canada; lead and zinc from Africa, Mexico, and Peru. Even our great steel production—the largest in the world—is dependent upon iron ore which comes from such widely separated spots as Canada, Newfoundland, Sweden, North Africa, Venezuela and Brazil, and upon manganese which comes from India, Brazil and Africa. Tungsten comes from Spain, Bolivia and Australia. Tin comes from Malaya, Indonesia, the Belgian Congo, and Bolivia.

Thus, the materials we need come from all over the world. And almost every other country in the

world is interested, to a greater or less extent, in getting some of those materials too.

So just as we have the problem in the United States of seeing to it that the supplies available to us are fairly distributed in a way that will best produce the things we need the most, so we have the problem internationally of seeing that the supplies available to the free world are distributed fairly among the countries of the free world in a way that will best produce the things that we need the most.

We dealt with the same problem in World War II. But then it was in many ways an easier problem than it is today. In the first place, we were then in a state of total war. It is always much easier for people to accept drastic measures of control in such a period than it is in the current period of partial mobilization, particularly when the present condition is one that is likely to last for a long time. In the second place, in World War II the United States and the United Kingdom had absolute control of the seas and could pretty much control by their own efforts the distribution of materials throughout the world.

Today, however, we are happily not in a state of total war, and we hope we will not be. We have to take into account a far greater degree of civilian requirements than we did in World War II, and the United States and the United Kingdom do not have available the means of enforcing control of distribution of materials that they had in World War II.

So we had to adopt a different approach.

It was obviously undesirable simply to let everyone scramble for an inadequate supply of materials. That would not have got the materials where they were needed; would have resulted in even higher prices than have developed; and it would have caused a lot of ill will. It was obviously not possible to create a supergovernment that would do internationally what each government does internally with respect to distribution of materials. It was obviously not necessary to have international machinery to deal with all scarce materials.

Creation of International Materials Conference

So what happened was a very simple and, at the same time, a very pioneering experiment. The United States, Britain, and France looked over the scene and decided that there were a dozen or so important commodities which then presented real international problems. These commodities were sulphur, tungsten and molybdenum, manganese, nickel and cobalt, wool, cotton, copper, lead and zinc, and newsprint.

The three Governments then invited the countries which accounted for the vast majority of the free world production and consumption of these materials to meet together in Washington to try to agree as to how they could most fairly be distributed among the countries of the free world,

to see how supplies might be increased, and to see what could be done by the various countries to economize in their use.

These invitations were accepted by almost every country invited to participate. International committees met and got to work. They called themselves the International Materials Conference. The problem they faced was much the same problem the U.S. Government faced which I have just described. They had to find out how much of each of the materials with which they were working would be available, how much each of the countries represented, and also the countries not represented, would need, and when there was not enough to go around, how the deficit could most fairly be apportioned.

Their first problem was to get at the facts. They had to find out how much would be needed and how much would be available. If this is hard in the United States, it is even harder internationally. Each country kept its figures on a different basis. Some kept very few figures at all. Each country considered different things important. Some countries could present a very good justification for their requirements; others were not able to do so, even though their needs might have been equally deserving. Few had very accurate estimates of supply.

When the totals were added up, it was clear that almost everyone needed more than he would be able to get. So the next job was to see how the inadequate supply available could be most fairly distributed.

In the United States this is hard enough. And there the Government can decide and enforce its decisions. In the international field there is no supergovernment. The committees doing the job have no formal constitution. They have no powers of compulsion. They can merely recommend action to governments.

Yet, since they started their work in the spring of 1951, they have been able to agree upon the international allocation for the last quarter of 1951 and the first quarter of 1952, and in some cases for the third quarter of 1951 as well, of copper, zinc, nickel, cobalt, sulphur, tungsten, molybdenum, and some newsprint.

They agreed that there were such adequate supplies of cotton, lead and manganese that no international allocation was needed. They failed to agree on any action for wool.

These allocations were not only recommended by the committees. They have been accepted and put into effect by the governments represented.

This is a very remarkable achievement; particularly when you think how absolutely vital a satisfactory distribution of these key materials is to both the producing and the consuming countries. It is the more remarkable that the allocations have been so handled that not only have the allocations been accepted and put into effect by the countries that developed them in the commit-

tees, but there has been hardly a single complaint from any nonparticipating country that the allocation which it received was not fair. This was accomplished by inviting in representatives of countries not members of the committees and hearing their case and consulting them as to their requirements.

Problem of International Price Control

There is one other big set of problems concerning materials that I want to mention.

As every businessman knows, people are interested not only in how much material they get and when they get it, but what they have to pay for it. And this question of price is, of course, absolutely vital to all producers. So when we deal with materials domestically and when we deal with them internationally, we keep running into the question of price.

This is a very thorny and tangled question, because it involves a head-on collision of at least two major national objectives. The first of these objectives is to avoid inflation. One of the easiest ways to stimulate inflation is to start a steady rise in raw materials prices, because these prices, as you know, enter into everything that is made and are pyramided as they go on through the manufacturing and selling process.

On the other hand, it is a vital national objective for us to get more of these scarce materials produced. If we don't get more of them we won't be able to do a lot of the things that we absolutely have to do. The most effective, most direct and most natural way of getting more production of almost anything is to offer a higher price. So there's the dilemma. If you don't raise the price, you don't get enough materials. If you do raise the price, you tend to get inflation.

Our stabilization policy also collides with the law of supply and demand. Prices can be controlled reasonably effectively within the country, because legal means of enforcement are available and, moreover, people are generally disposed to accept controls on prices of what they sell when they see that the prices of what they buy are also controlled. This is, however, not true internationally. There are no legal means for enforcement of price-control measures and, in most cases, the producers have to buy at least a large proportion of what they need in uncontrolled markets.

Moreover, most producers of raw materials are very allergic to the idea of limits on the prices they charge because they say: "It's all very well for you consumers to want to put a ceiling on prices of our products when there isn't enough to go around and prices are going up. But when did you ever do anything to help us out in times when there was far too much of our product and prices were going way down? You were glad to take

advantage of the low prices then. You should be willing to pay high prices now."

So the problem that we face is what kind of an arrangement can be made with the producers which will not do violence to our program of price stabilization domestically, which will give them a fair price and will get us the materials we need. Any ideas will be much appreciated!

This is by no means the end of the catalog of problems connected with raw materials. But I think I've said enough to demonstrate that although the fundamental job which this country is trying to do of building formidable military strength for ourselves and our allies and maintaining the highest level possible of civilian activity at the same time can be very simply stated, the job of achieving it is infinitely complicated. Because of limiting factors that are just as real and just as simple as the fact that there aren't enough raw materials to go around, we can't build the military strength that we require and maintain the easy civilian life to which we have become accustomed. Therefore, hard choices are involved and sacrifices have to be made. The question is not whether we get along with less, but how we do it. And the more clearly this is understood all through the country, and the more everyone cooperates with each other and the Government, the more efficiently the job will be done, and the more fairly to all concerned.

Voluntary Exports for Relief and Rehabilitation

[Released to the press February 7]

Charles P. Taft, chairman of the advisory committee on voluntary foreign aid, has reported to Assistant Secretary Thorp that voluntary exports of goods and funds for relief and rehabilitation for the 6 months ending December 31, 1951, reported by 44 agencies registered with the committee approximated 29 million dollars in value. Church agencies—Protestant, Catholic, and Jewish—accounted for 60 percent, CARE 25 percent, American Relief for Korea 7 percent, and agencies of general service 8 percent. More than 75 percent of the goods and funds were distributed to nationals and refugees in 14 countries of the 90 beneficiary areas scattered throughout the world. These countries were Germany, Korea, Italy, Israel, Austria, Great Britain, France, Japan, Greece, India, Lebanon, Arab Palestine, Jordan, and Syria.

Denmark: Copyright Extension

A PROCLAMATION¹

WHEREAS the President is authorized, in accordance with the conditions prescribed in section 9 of title 17 of the United States Code, which includes the provisions of the act of Congress approved March 4, 1909, 35 Stat. 1075, as amended by the act of September 25, 1941, 55 Stat. 732, to grant an extension of time for fulfillment of the conditions and formalities prescribed by the copyright laws of the United States of America, with respect to works first produced or published outside the United States of America and subject to copyright or to renewal of copyright under the laws of the United States of America, by nationals of countries which accord substantially equal treatment to citizens of the United States of America; and

WHEREAS satisfactory official assurances have been received that since March 1, 1913, citizens of the United States have been entitled to obtain copyright protection for their works in Denmark on substantially the same basis as citizens of Denmark without the need of complying with any formalities, provided such works secured protection in the United States; and

WHEREAS, by virtue of a proclamation by the President of the United States of America, dated April 9, 1910 (36 Stat. 2685), citizens of Denmark are, and since July 1, 1909, have been, entitled to the benefits of the aforementioned act of March 4, 1909, other than the benefits of section 1 (e) of that act; and

WHEREAS, by virtue of a proclamation by the President of the United States of America, dated December 9, 1920 (41 Stat. 1810), the citizens of Denmark are, and since December 9, 1920, have been, entitled to the benefits of section 1 (e) of the aforementioned act of March 4, 1909:

Now THEREFORE, I, HARRY S. TRUMAN, President of the United States of America, under and by virtue of the authority vested in me by the aforesaid title 17, do declare and proclaim:


That with respect to (1) works of citizens of Denmark which were first produced or published outside the United States of America on or after September 3, 1939, and subject to copyright under the laws of the United States of America, and (2) works of citizens of Denmark subject to renewal of copyright under the laws of the United States of America on or after September 3, 1939, there has existed during several years of the time since September 3, 1939, such disruption or suspension of facilities essential to compliance with the conditions and formalities prescribed with respect to such works by the copyright laws of the United States of America as to bring such works within the terms of the aforesaid title 17, and that, accordingly, the time within which compliance with such conditions and formalities may take place is hereby extended with respect to such works for one year after the date of this proclamation.

It shall be understood that the term of copyright in any case is not and cannot be altered or affected by this proclamation, and that, as provided by the aforesaid title 17, no liability shall attach under the said title for lawful uses made or sets done prior to the effective date of this proclamation in connection with the above-described works, or in respect to the continuance for one year subsequent to such date of any business undertaking or enterprise lawfully entered into prior to such date involving expenditure or contractual obligation in connection with the exploitation, production, reproduction, circulation, or performance of any such work.

¹ 17 Fed. Reg. 1143.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the Seal of the United States of America to be affixed.

DONE at the City of Washington this fourth day of February in the year of our Lord nineteen hundred and fifty-two and of the Independence of the United States of America the one hundred and seventy-sixth.



By the President:
DEAN ACHESON
Secretary of State.

Recent Releases—Continued from page 252

Vocational Education: Cooperative Program in the Dominican Republic. Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2244. Pub. 4229. 17 pp. 10¢.

Agreement between the United States and the Dominican Republic—Signed at Ciudad Trujillo Mar. 16, 1951; entered into force Mar. 16, 1951.

Health and Sanitation: Cooperative Program in Brazil. Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2236. Pub. 4237. 5 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and Brazil—Signed at Rio de Janeiro June 13 and 29, 1950; entered into force Aug. 25, 1950.

Red Cross Field Hospital in Korea. Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2268. Pub. 4314. 3 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and Sweden—Signed at Washington June 27, 1951; entered into force June 27, 1951.

Technical Cooperation: Assistance for Libya. Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2270. Pub. 4316. 9 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States, the United Kingdom, and France—Signed at London June 15, 1951; entered into force June 15, 1951.

Technical Cooperation. Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2271. Pub. 4317. 3 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and Ethiopia—Signed at Addis Ababa June 16, 1951; entered into force June 16, 1951.

Technical Cooperation. Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2272. Pub. 4318. 12 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and Cuba—Signed at Habana June 20, 1951; entered into force June 20, 1951.

Exchange of Official Publications. Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2297. Pub. 4353. 3 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and India—Exchange of notes signed at New Delhi Nov. 8, 1950 and Jan. 11, 1951; entered into force Jan. 11, 1951.

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND CONFERENCES

New Airways System for Western Europe

**SPECIAL MEETING ON COORDINATION OF AIR TRAFFIC,
PARIS, NOVEMBER 20-23, 1951**

by Thomas T. Carter

Since the beginning of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), control of air traffic in the European area has been recognized as a difficult problem brought about, mainly, by (1) the lack of an air-traffic-control system and associated facilities with standardized practices and procedures; (2) the lack of an established airways system; and (3) the lack of effective coordination between the civil and military authorities. Several air-traffic-control plans for Europe have been developed at ICAO regional meetings, but for one reason or another none has been successfully put into effect.

During the past year, a substantial increase in military air traffic, particularly in jet aircraft operations and in the establishment of numerous prohibited or restricted areas, has aggravated Europe's air-traffic-control problems. United States and other international air carriers have been obliged, therefore, to re-route and, in some instances, even to curtail their operations.

Last May the Netherlands Government, greatly disturbed over the increased operating difficulties that civil air operators encountered, proposed that ICAO study the problem with the view to convening a special meeting to which military experts of the states concerned would be invited. On June 29 the ICAO Council requested the interested states as a matter of urgency to furnish their comments by August 6. The replies to such an inquiry confirmed the seriousness of the problem and a special meeting was convened at Paris October 8-12, 1951.

Two important and encouraging developments resulted: (1) all states represented agreed that the establishment of an airways system would be an important step toward the solution of the increasingly complex problem of coordinating civil and military air operations in Western Europe; and (2) at an informal meeting held at Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE)

outside the ICAO framework on October 12, the military advisers of each delegation agreed that an international airways traffic-control system should be established for Western Europe without delay and recommended this course of action to their respective chiefs of delegations.

It was the consensus of the ICAO meeting, however, that although considerable progress had been made, a further meeting of the interested states outside the ICAO framework should be convened in the near future to continue the discussions, either under the auspices of NATO or on invitation of the French Government to the states concerned. It was subsequently agreed to proceed on the basis of the second alternative and, accordingly, France issued invitations to Denmark, Belgium, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and the United States, as well as representatives of the Allied High Commission in Germany, to send civil and military representatives to a further meeting at Paris beginning on November 20.

The composition of this U.S. delegation to this meeting was as follows:

Thomas T. Carter, U.S. Civil Air Attaché, Paris; Howard F. Rough, C. A. A. Aeronautical Adviser to the Department of State, American Embassy, Paris; John T. Straker, Commander, USN, Naval Air Facility, Port Lyautey; Roland B. Sturtevant, Chief Adviser, London International Field Office, C. A. A. Department of Commerce.

The French secretariat in advance of the meeting proposed the following agenda:

1. Chairman's summary of circumstances leading up to the meeting. *Purpose of the meeting:* Establishment of an Airways Network for Western Europe in terms of civil and military requirements.
2. Analysis and bearing of the document worked out at the SHAPE meeting October 12, 1951, by the military representatives attached to the Delegations of the NATO nations accredited to ICAO.
3. Airways Network as proposed by the civil authorities.
4. Flight itineraries required for civil aviation in West-

ern Europe and for which the organization of an airway is not justified.

5. Chart of areas exclusively reserved to the military authorities (training, bombing, target practice, etc.) to be provided by the said authorities.

6. General organization of air traffic control in areas of heavy military traffic.

7. Procedures to be drawn up for civil and military traffic outside the airways and outside the restricted military areas.

Comments in Regard to 6 & 7—The purpose of the meeting is to reach an agreement on the establishment of definite and lasting airways. The detailed elaboration of the above questions should be carried out by every nation concerned as a matter of urgency.

8. Possibility of a further civil and military meeting before ICAO meets in February 1952.

At the first plenary session of this meeting on November 20 two functioning bodies were established: the chiefs of the delegations and a synthesis committee. The latter was to act as a working group and was responsible for adjusting and consolidating the individual airways plans of the states concerned into a Western European airways system. The former was responsible for resolving questions posed by the working group and for reaching the final decisions of the conference.

The synthesis committee studied the airways plans of the individual countries in order to make the necessary changes and adjustments to establish a consolidated airways network. It had some difficulty in the smoothing out of certain routes, particularly between Belgium and France. However, the work of the synthesis committee progressed well, and, at the final plenary session on November 23, the meeting unanimously agreed on a definite plan for an airways system for Western Europe. The president of the conference, M. Nottet of Belgium, transmitted the final report of the meeting to the Council of ICAO to assist that body in preparing for the Europe-Mediterranean Air Navigation Meeting in February 1952, where the problem is expected to be studied further.

The accomplishments of this conference from the point of view of United States interests were very satisfactory. A number of difficult problems of implementation remain to be solved before the newly agreed-upon airways system in Western Europe can become a reality. The problems include the distribution and layout of air-navigation facilities and the organization of flight-information services in regions of heavy military traffic and the organization of joint control of the airways. Despite such difficulties of implementation, the U.S. delegation feels that the Western European states concerned will exert every appropriate and feasible effort to implement the agreed-upon airways plan as soon as possible.

Resulting from the two recent successful meetings at Paris is a vitally important momentum directed to the solution of Western Europe's air-traffic-control problems. In the opinion of the majority of the delegates attending the meeting, much greater progress has been made than was thought possible in midsummer of 1951. The end

of the road can now be seen more clearly, and, if the approaching ICAO European-Mediterranean Air Navigation Meeting is successful in capitalizing on the results of the recent Paris meeting, a further important step will have been taken by the European states to put their air space in order.

• *Thomas T. Carter, author of the above article, is Civil Air Attaché for the American Embassy at Paris. Mr. Carter was Chairman of the U.S. Delegation to the Special Meeting on Air Traffic.*

U.N. Committee Considers Restrictive Business Practices

[Released to the press January 30]

Representatives of 10 U.N. countries met at U.N. headquarters at New York on January 29, 1952, to draft an agreement against cartels and other restrictive business practices in international trade. The U.S. representative at the *Ad Hoc* Committee on Restrictive Business Practices of the U.N. Economic and Social Council (Ecosoc) is Corwin D. Edwards, Director of the Bureau of Industrial Economics, Federal Trade Commission.

The *Ad Hoc* Committee on Restrictive Business Practices was established by a resolution adopted on September 13, 1951, at the thirteenth session of the Economic and Social Council.¹ The Committee is composed of representatives of Belgium, Canada, France, India, Mexico, Pakistan, Sweden, the United Kingdom, the United States, and Uruguay.

The main purpose of the meeting at U.N. headquarters is to prepare for the Economic and Social Council the draft of an international agreement to implement the Council's resolution that U.N. members should act together to prevent restrictive business practices adversely affecting international trade. The program seeks effective cooperative international measures to eliminate those cartel or other restrictive business practices in international trade which divide up markets, foster monopolistic control of industry, or otherwise eliminate competition in trade whenever these practices curb expansion of production or trade, interfere with economic development of underdeveloped areas of the world, or lower standards of living.

The Committee is also charged with the responsibility for the preparation of a report, based on information to be obtained from governments, specialized agencies of the United Nations and other sources, on restrictive business practices, and on measures which have been taken by individual member states to eliminate them.

¹ BULLETIN of Oct. 8, 1951, p. 595.

U.S., U.K., France Propose Special General Assembly Session On Korean Problems

*Statement by Ernest A. Gross
U.S. Delegate to the General Assembly¹*

Members of the First Committee will recall the discussions which led it to decide to postpone for the time being the consideration of the Korean item on its agenda. Since some members of the Joint Committee may not be familiar with those discussions, I should like to review briefly the reasons which have prompted my Government, along with the Governments of France and the United Kingdom, to introduce the present draft resolution.

The United States is disturbed by the slow course of the armistice negotiations at Panmunjom. We share with all other peace-loving nations a profound sense of disappointment that a satisfactory end to the hostilities has not yet been reached despite the sincere and patient efforts of the United Nations side.

My Government, responsible for the Unified Command of the United Nations, has consistently made and continues to make every possible effort to achieve an armistice under honorable and satisfactory conditions. From the beginning of the aggression on June 25, 1950, the United States has loyally supported all United Nations efforts to bring this aggression to an end and to conclude a just and durable peace. The initiative for peace has, from the start, been with the United Nations.

The United States is most anxious that the General Assembly should proceed to its consideration of the political and economic aspects of the Korean problem. We hope this will lead to the establishment of a unified, independent, and democratic Korea, and to the economic recovery and rehabilitation of that devastated land. These are matters to which my Government has always attached, and continues to attach, the highest priority.

Avoiding Political Discussions

Precisely because we are anxious to go forward, we desire to avoid premature political discussions

¹ Made in Committee I and Joint Committees II and III (Political and Security, Economic and Financial, Social, Humanitarian, and Cultural) on Feb. 2 and released to the press by the U.S. Mission to the U.N. on the same date. Mr. Gross is U.S. deputy representative to the United Nations.

which could postpone or complicate the conclusion of an armistice. It is the armistice which will open the way to constructive consideration of political issues. A lasting political solution to the Korean problem must rest on a sound and secure foundation. The successful conclusion of the negotiations at Panmunjom will provide that foundation.

Tripartite Resolution on Korea

U.N. doc. A/L. 107
Approved Feb. 5, 1952

THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY,

DESIRING to facilitate to the greatest possible extent the negotiations in Panmunjom and the conclusion of an armistice in Korea, and

WISHING to avoid premature consideration of items 17¹ and 27² of the agenda of the present session,

I.

Decides that (a) upon notification by the Unified Command to the Security Council of the conclusion of an armistice in Korea, the Secretary-General shall convene a special session of the General Assembly at the permanent Headquarters of the United Nations to consider the above-mentioned items, or (b) when other developments in Korea make desirable consideration of the above-mentioned items, the Secretary-General, acting in accordance with Article 20 of the Charter and with the rules of procedure of the General Assembly, shall convene a special session or an emergency special session of the General Assembly at the permanent Headquarters of the United Nations.

II.

Requests the Negotiating Committee for Extra-Budgetary Funds established by the resolution adopted at the 352nd meeting of the General Assembly on 7 December 1951³ to undertake negotiations regarding voluntary contributions to the programme of the United Nations Korean Reconstruction Agency for relief and rehabilitation of Korea.

¹ The problem of the independence of Korea: Report of the United Nations Commission for the unification and rehabilitation of Korea.

² Relief and rehabilitation of Korea: Report of the United Nations Agent General for Korean Reconstruction.

³ U.N. doc. A/L. 4.

Discussion here and at this time of political issues, in conjunction with the current military negotiations in Korea, could only make more involved the already complicated problems which now face the commanders in the field. Such discussion would involve this Committee in matters of a technical military nature, which can be resolved satisfactorily only by the military negotiators on the scene in Korea.

The wisdom of keeping military questions separate from political or territorial matters has repeatedly been recognized by all parties to the negotiations. Moreover, this was made clear even before the negotiations had begun. On June 23, 1951, the world received an indication, too long deferred, that the aggressors in Korea at last were seeking to begin armistice negotiations. The Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister within a few days told the American Ambassador that the armistice which the Soviet Government envisaged would be limited strictly to military questions, without involving political or territorial considerations.

Neither peace in Korea nor any settlement of its political problems is possible until a satisfactory armistice has been reached. Only when it has been reached can we fruitfully move on to the problems of the long-term settlement.

The draft tripartite resolution is designed to meet this requirement. Let there be no mistake as to our motives in proposing this course. The resolution provides for the immediate calling of a special session of the General Assembly in New York upon notification by the Unified Command to the Security Council of the conclusion of an armistice in Korea.

The draft contemplates that the General Assembly will move immediately toward the attainment of the political objectives in Korea once an armistice has been concluded.

The resolution also provides for the calling of a special or emergency session when other developments in Korea make this course desirable. We make no recommendations here as to the precise conditions under which such a session might be called. Such machinery can appropriately be put into operation when the majority of the United Nations deems this step advisable in the light of the then existing situation.

Under the formula proposed in this draft resolution, the authority of the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea will continue unimpaired. In other words, the U.N. machinery designed to assist in the accomplishment of the unification of Korea will remain in operation as long as necessary, or unless and until it is superseded.

Program of Korean Relief

Part II of the draft deals with a most serious and pressing problem—the program for the relief and rehabilitation of Korea.

Under the draft resolution, agenda item No. 27, the consideration of the report by the United Nations Agent General for Korean Reconstruction, would be deferred. From this it follows that there would likewise be deferment of that part of agenda item No. 22 which relates to section 1 of chapter VII of the Economic and Social Council Report on relief and rehabilitation of Korea. This, we think, is in keeping with the suggestion to defer consideration of the political question.

But it is most important, I suggest, that the General Assembly authorize the Negotiating Committee for Extra-Budgetary Funds to go forward in seeking contributions for the continuation of the program of the United Nations Korean Reconstruction Agency (UNKRA). Part II provides for this.

While hostilities in Korea continue, it is impossible for the United Nations Korean Reconstruction Agency, created on December 1, 1950, by the General Assembly, to undertake full responsibility for the relief and rehabilitation of Korea. The emergency relief needs of the Korean people have been met under the direction of the United Nations Command, over 200 million dollars of goods and services have been supplied through the Unified Command. Approximately 20 million dollars of this amount has been contributed by various governments, nongovernmental organizations and international agencies; the balance has been made available by the United States Government.

The original program of UNKRA was established at 250 million dollars to meet the basic needs of relief and rehabilitation of Korea during the first year of its full-scale operation. Although the military situation has prevented UNKRA from undertaking this full program during the past year, UNKRA has been furnishing technical assistance and providing personnel. They are engaged in the distribution of relief supplies, the prevention of epidemics, related health and welfare activities, and short-term economic rehabilitation.

UNKRA has recently completed arrangements with the United Nations Command for joint programming. This will enable UNKRA to carry out a number of projects of relief and rehabilitation in Korea in the immediate future. Some of this can be done even before the cessation of hostilities. UNKRA can also plan to assume full responsibility for relief and rehabilitation with maximum efficiency when the military circumstances permit.

Of the 205 million dollars pledged to UNKRA, a relatively minor part has been paid in cash. Additional payments are required to meet UNKRA's immediate financial needs; and additional pledges will be needed to bring the total up to the 250 million dollar program.

Part II of the draft resolution will permit the Negotiating Committee to approach governments at the appropriate time regarding their contributions to UNKRA. We hope that additional payments and pledges will be obtained to permit

UNKRA's program in Korea to go forward and to come into full-scale operation as soon as the military situation permits. In this way the United Nations will continue to fulfill the responsibility it has assumed, through the United Nations Korean Reconstruction Agency, for assisting the Korean people to relieve their suffering and to repair the devastation which aggression has brought to their country.

Along with other loyal members of the United Nations, we are fully aware of our responsibilities to see that Korea becomes unified and independent. Of most immediate importance, however, is our responsibility to insure that nothing shall be done which will delay or prevent the end of the aggression in Korea under conditions which will safeguard the future of the Korean people and the peace of the area.

U.N. Directs Further Mediation of Kashmir Dispute

Statement by John C. Ross

*U.S. Delegate to the General Assembly*¹

When last the Security Council considered a report from the U.N. representative [for India and Pakistan] Frank Graham, the U.S. representative observed that the practice of mediation is one of the greatest of arts, and it is certain that in his own country Mr. Graham is one of its most distinguished practitioners. This fact is even more clearly apparent today. The U.N. representative has been patient; he has been tolerant; he has been accurate; and he has been dispassionate. His aim is, as it has been, to build agreement, brick by brick, to form the structure of a settlement between two sovereign states. This is a purpose as simple to state as it is difficult to accomplish in the tensions of the world in which we live and of which we are all a part.

His report of December 18, 1951² and his oral presentation of it to the Security Council on January 17, 1952, are monuments, if one requires them, to this art of mediation. His report is outstanding for one thing alone. It carefully states the issue. The issue is to find an agreed, and I emphasize the word agreed, not an imposed solution for three questions. "First, a definite period for demilitarization; second, the scope of demilitarization and quantum of forces that will remain at the end of the period of demilitarization; third,

the day for the formal induction into office of the Plebiscite Administrator." (S/PV/570, page 27).

Mr. Graham goes beyond stating the issue. He has put before the Security Council the principles on which the questions can be resolved. First, there must be agreement of the parties if the settlement is to be lasting, and naturally agreement must involve compromise. One can search in vain in his report for any suggestion or any implication of an imposed settlement that would force upon the parties or the people of Kashmir a political future not of their own choosing. He is attempting to bring about a free and impartial plebiscite. To use his own words when he addressed this Council a few weeks ago: "The Plebiscite would keep the promise made to the people of Jammu and Kashmir who are worthy of the right of their own self-determination through a secure and impartial plebiscite."

The second principle implicit in his work is that this dispute must not be deadlocked, but must show movement along the road to settlement. Time is running against both parties. One side or the other may feel that delay will somehow favor its cause. But delay and frustration are not allies of either side. They are mortal enemies of both. The forces of chaos work internally and also from the outside. Time is not a luxury to any of us whose objectives and principles are fundamentally similar. Whoever would suggest, in seriousness, that all of the structure, built brick by brick, be abandoned? Again I would let the U.N. representative speak for himself. He told us a few weeks ago that the time has passed when society can safely take slow decades and centuries to

¹ Made in the Security Council on Jan. 30 and released to the press by the U.S. Mission to the U.N. on the same date.

² For excerpts from Mr. Graham's first report, transmitted to the Security Council on Oct. 15, 1951, also excerpts from his statement before the Security Council on Oct. 18 in which he analyzed the main proposals and recommendations of the report, see BULLETIN of Nov. 5, 1951, p. 738. For excerpts from the second report of Dec. 19, 1951, see BULLETIN of Jan. 14, 1952, p. 52.

muddle through adjustments. Social drift and unsettled disputes, he added, and he mentioned specifically the Kashmir issue, can now possibly involve mankind, if allowed to go unchecked, in the swift and total tragedy of global war.

The U.N. representative has put before the parties a 12-point program. It provides a logical and well balanced framework in which to carry out the demilitarization upon which the parties themselves have agreed and which they have also agreed is a necessary prelude to the holding of a plebiscite. Through that plebiscite, the parties have agreed that the people of the State can exercise their right of self-determination. My Government feels today as it did when Ambassador Gross addressed the Council on November 10^a that these 12 points form a solid basis on which the parties can reach agreement (S/PV.566, page 12). Since last November Mr. Graham has made progress. It has been slow, but progress there has been. He has formulated the outstanding issues which I stated a minute ago and which are now all that stand between the parties and a completely operative agreement. In one way or another, he tells us, solutions can be found for these problems. I was struck by what he said of the fixing of a day for the induction into office of a plebiscite administrator. This he has called a linchpin that would integrate his program. My Government agrees.

As one looks around the Council table and sees the two parties to the dispute sitting here with the U.N. representative, one sees in this fact tangible evidence of a desire to settle this case by the peaceful means which members of the United Nations have obligated themselves to use in the settlement of disputes. If we look back to the Graham report of October 15 of last year there was agreement on four of his 12 principles; then in his report of November 19 there was agreement on four more, thus reducing the issues to their bare bones. This is the progress which has been made up to now toward the settlement of the Kashmir question.

The United States feels that this progress has not been and should not be halted. In coming weeks we shall look for clear evidence of movement toward settlement of the basic issues. The United States feels that none of the remaining issues is an insurmountable barrier between the parties and a peaceful solution—a Charter solution—an agreed solution. Not lightly should the parties or any of us cast away the fabric of agreement as it now exists.

The Security Council gave its representative a heavy task by its resolution of March 30, 1951, which, in its third and fifth paragraphs, instructed him to effect demilitarization and analyze the points of difference between the parties. The Se-

curity Council has further instructed him on November 10, 1951, in paragraph 2 of its resolution:

to continue his efforts to obtain agreement of the parties on a plan for effecting the demilitarization of the State of Jammu and Kashmir.

This is precisely the task upon which Mr. Graham is now engaged. The Council has asked him for reports from time to time.

Mr. Graham has narrowed the issues to two critical ones, and the emphasis must now be put on resolving these two issues. The efforts of the next weeks will either see these issues resolved or we shall know that patience, persistence, and wisdom have once again been unrewarded except, perhaps, by frustration and dilatory maneuvers. In this sense, Mr. Graham's continued effort might justly be described as a final one.

We agree that Mr. Graham needs no further directive from the Security Council, and we feel that this continued effort will necessarily involve his return to the subcontinent of India and Pakistan and will involve a report, a final report, which we should expect by the end of March, as various of our colleagues have indicated this afternoon.

He told us on January 17 that "negotiation" is still the way to solution of the unresolved issues. He also expressed the view that the time has met with the place and the opportunity to settle this dispute. We agree with this view. We would also venture to express the hope that leadership by the parties—indeed, real statesmanship on their part—will lead to a successful "negotiation" and speedy solution of this dispute which has too long remained unsolved.

Communiqués Regarding Korea to the Security Council

The Headquarters of the United Nations Command has transmitted communiqués regarding Korea to the Secretary-General of the United Nations under the following United Nations document numbers issued in 1951: S/2417, November 23; S/2420, November 24; S/2421, November 28; S/2423, November 30; S/2424, November 30; S/2427, December 3; S/2428, December 3; S/2429, December 4; S/2431, December 7; S/2433, December 7; S/2436, December 10; S/2437, December 12; S/2438, December 12; S/2439, December 12; S/2440, December 17; S/2441, December 17; S/2444, December 18; S/2445, December 18; S/2447, December 19; S/2453, December 31; S/2454, December 31; S/2455, December 31; S/2456, December 31; S/2457, December 31.

^a BULLETIN of Dec. 10, 1951, p. 958.

The Soviet Pattern in the Sixth General Assembly

by Philip C. Jessup

U.S. Delegate to the General Assembly¹

I look on the whole business of the Assembly as part of the process of "parliamentary diplomacy." You have a process in the United Nations which is in part normal diplomatic negotiation and partly the kind of parliamentary process which you have in any national legislative body. I think it is very important to keep those two factors in mind, because you are all conscious of the way those supplement and interfere with each other as the committee meetings go along.

The thing that struck me in the final sessions was the statement that Mr. Malik of the Soviet Union made in the joint meeting of the First, Second, and Third Committees on the Korean item, that the third world war had started. He said, of course, that it had been started by the "aggressive Anglo-American bloc." The fact that he chose to put it in that way, I think, has a good deal of significance. It is, of course, directly contrary to the belief which we have constantly adhered to that there is no necessity of another war, it isn't inevitable, and that it can be prevented.

As I have been thinking about his statement, it seemed to me that which it might reflect is the fact that the Soviets over a period of time have been seeking to create a Soviet monopoly of the word "peace." And the initiative of France, the United Kingdom, and the United States in moving forward with disarmament proposals at this time tended to break the monopoly. It certainly took the initiative away from them. And now, when they can't monopolize the peace theme any more, they are swinging over to the "line" that the third war is here. In other words, I think that is in a sense an acknowledgment of defeat, although they won't admit it.

I think it is interesting that they tie this statement to the colonial issue and talk about the aggression of the West in Korea, in Indochina, in Malaya, in Burma, in Egypt, in Tunis, Morocco, etc.

¹ Excerpts from extemporaneous remarks made before the United Nations Correspondents Association at Paris on Feb. 5, and released to the press by the U.S. Mission to the U.N. on Feb. 7.

Personally, I don't think that one can recall too often the statement of Stalin in his book on *The Problems of Leninism*. The gist of it, as you remember, is the statement of how you move in on the Asiatic countries; that first you promote nationalism because nationalism will throw out the old colonial powers; and then having promoted nationalism to the point where you eliminate the colonial powers, you then develop internationalism in the sense of the Communist International, and you move them into the Communist sphere.

That is a pattern which I think has been borne out by their actions all the way through. When they find that a country in following this nationalistic revolt against colonialism is not also moving into the Communist sphere, then they quickly change, as they did in the case of Indonesia. When they found that Indonesian independence was being aided by the United States and other countries, they immediately began to denounce Hatta and Soekarno as traitors to the cause of nationalism.

On that general field, it seems to me the United States position has been made pretty clear. People have wondered a little bit about the stand of the United States on the Moroccan issue and on our general relations with the Arab States, but the recent speech of Secretary Acheson,² I think, was not only a very forthright statement but at the same time a reiteration in strong terms of a theme which the American Government has sounded several times before in the last 2 years.

Since the end of the war, 15 different states have come into existence as new independent states—India, Pakistan, Burma, Ceylon, Indonesia, Libya, the Philippines, etc. All of them, of course, have attained their independence from the Western so-called colonial powers.

Contrast that development with the absorption of states into the Soviet system: the disappearance of the Balkan States, and the practical disappearance of the satellite states as independent members of the community of nations.

² BULLETIN of Feb. 4, 1952, p. 155.

Soviet Attitude Toward Information

Now, let me make a few observations on the general question of information and news coverage. It seems to me one of the very real problems in the whole international field.

One of the striking remarks which one of the Soviet representatives made—it was Mr. Pavlov in the Third Committee when Mr. Tobias was talking about the Oatis case—was that if any newsman sticks his nose into the Soviet Union, he will have his paws chopped off. A very graphic description, I think, of their general attitude on the question.

I think it is rather interesting to look at some statistics on the area of the Soviet Union which is closed to foreigners. Following the recent decree shutting off additional areas, we figure that 80 percent of Soviet territory, inhabited by about 65 percent of the total Soviet population, is now, in effect, closed to foreigners.

That, frankly, is the sort of picture which bothers us in terms of making progress in the whole disarmament field. As you know, we are not convinced that you are going to get anywhere with disarmament unless you have an inspection system.

Conflicting Friendships

Moving into the general field of the Assembly, I sometimes feel that many of the problems that arise for the United States result from having so many friends. Most of the difficulties we have had in this Assembly result from the fact that we are friends of both parties to several disputes. You can run down the list; take our old Indonesian case, for example. We liked the Dutch; we had very close relations with them. On the other hand, we had great sympathy with the Indonesians; and those two friendships were in conflict.

The same thing is true throughout the history of the Palestine case in our friendship for Israel and in our friendship for the Arab States.

It is true today in terms of the problems in North Africa; with our friendship for France on the one hand, and our general sympathy with the people who are aspiring to a larger measure of self-determination, autonomy, and independence.

All the way around, we really don't feel that we are parties to many of these tense controversies in terms of being on one side or the other. We feel that we are friends to both sides. Frequently, one

or the other gets irritated with us because we are not giving 100-percent support to their side. It is one of our major problems.

Soviet Behavior in International Negotiations

I'd like to say another word about the Soviet attitude in negotiations. They operate on a 100-percent basis. My first experience with that was in the first commission I served on, the United Nations Codification Commission. We had one case where the Russians were, as usual, arguing one thing and we were arguing another. Koretzky, the Soviet representative, kept repeating his position and we kept moving in an effort to meet him. We finally got up within 95 percent of his position, and he was still saying No, No, No, and he voted against the 95-percent compromise. We then went back to the original and he lost 100 percent. I asked him afterward why he did that. "You knew perfectly well that if you turned down the compromise you would lose everything," I told him. "Well," he said, "I am not interested in compromises. My instructions were to get so and so."

Take for instance the disarmament discussions, the various changes which were introduced in the Tri-Power drafts in an attempt to meet various points that Vyshinsky brought up in the Four-Power subcommittee or brought up in the debates. The Soviets really were not in the least interested in that kind of advance. You have got to come all the way to meet them before they are interested.

I think that is further illustrated by the fact that when you do come around to a point of agreement, you don't get it so often through small concessions gradually bringing positions together. You are apt to get it, as you have all seen, I think, in a rather violent speech which denounces the other side 100 percent but ends up, "However, the Soviet delegation being in favor of peace accepts the proposition." They can make that kind of a 100 percent shift much easier that they can move, I think, a few inches at a time.

We have much greater flexibility and I think our tradition and habit is to move toward an accommodation; and this is something that they lack.

The U.S. in the U.N.,

a weekly feature, does not appear in this issue.

Reports of U. N. Command Operations in Korea

THIRTIETH REPORT: FOR THE PERIOD SEPTEMBER 16-30, 1951¹

U.N. doc. S/2412
Transmitted November 15, 1951

I herewith submit Report Number 30 of the United Nations Command Operations in Korea for the period 16-30 September, inclusive. United Nations Command Communiqués numbers 1023-1037, inclusive, provide detailed accounts of these operations.

No substantive progress was made during this period toward conclusion of a military armistice agreement. The recess in negotiations, initiated by the Communists on 23 August, remained in effect. Because Kaesong is in enemy-held territory, the enemy has the continuing capability of fabricating incidents at any time detrimental to the harmonious conduct of negotiations. Consequently, on 6 September 1951, I proposed that the liaison officers meet at Pan Mun Jom to discuss the selection of a new site where negotiations could be continued without interruptions. On 12 September 1951, Generals Kim Il Sung and Peng Teh-huai replied to my letter and demanded that the United Nations Command participate in the reinvestigation of alleged incidents already investigated in full. The Communist Command completely ignored the United Nations Command proposal that liaison officers meet to establish conditions that would be mutually satisfactory for the resumption of armistice negotiations.

In my reply on 17 September, it was pointed out that all alleged incidents have already been investigated, that the results of investigations have been furnished the Communist side, and that, except for the 10 September incident, United Nations Command forces were not involved. In this regard, the United Nations Command has consistently demonstrated an objective and responsible

attitude. I again proposed that liaison officers meet to discuss conditions for a resumption of the military armistice negotiations.

On 19 September, the Communist leaders again brought up the reinvestigation of "unsettled" incidents. This I flatly rejected on 23 September, again stating that United Nations Command liaison officers were prepared to meet to discuss conditions for terminating the recess.

Liaison officers from both sides met daily from the 24 to the 27 of September, inclusive. During these meetings the Communist liaison officers refused to discuss conditions for resumption of the armistice. On 27 September in a message to the Communist side I stated that since Communist liaison officers have stated that they were not authorized to discuss and arrange satisfactory conditions for resumption of armistice talks, I wished to submit a proposal. I proposed that both delegations meet as early as possible at a place approximately midway between the battle lines in the vicinity of Songhyon-Ni, and that upon resumption of meetings at this place both delegations be prepared to return to the discussion of agenda item two. To date no substantive response has been made by the Communist side to this proposal.

During the period covered by this report, hostile ground forces put up vigorous resistance to strong local attacks by United Nations Forces. During the long period of buildup, the enemy has thoroughly integrated his defensive positions which now include extensive earthworks, land mines, obstacles, and some tactical wire. These defenses are well manned and are relatively well supported by artillery and mortars. Recently, the enemy has employed anti-aircraft weapons against ground elements in his defensive operations.

Despite the strength of the hostile defenses, United Nations Forces made local gains of one to three miles on the eastern and western fronts and thoroughly probed hostile positions on the central front. During the latter part of the period the enemy made strong local attacks on various parts of the front and registered slight gains against newly acquired United Nations positions. Front lines at the close of the period ran northeast from Munsan to Chunggang, thence eastward to Sohul, and northeast to the vicinity of Pohang.

On the western front, United Nations Forces re-established the three advanced patrol bases which had been driven in by enemy attacks during the preceding period. Hostile action against bases at Kangso and Amhyon consisted primarily of small-scale attacks, probes, and artillery harassment. At Pangyo, United Nations Forces overcame bitter resistance after three days of fighting and by 19 September had re-established a patrol base two miles northwest of the town. Later the enemy made several unsuccessful attempts to dislodge United Nations Forces at Amhyon and Pangyo. On the extreme west flank there were numerous patrol contacts in the immediate vicinity of United Nations lines near Korangpo and west of Kangso.

Along the thirty mile central front from Chunggang to the Pukhan River near Tungdae, the enemy continued to intercept United Nations patrols in the immediate vicinity of United Nations lines. On 21 September, three United Nations Task Forces made deep probing attacks beyond Tuchon and Haso and in the direction of Chuktao. The enemy opposed these attacks with determination and provided strong artillery support to defending garrisons.

¹ Transmitted to the Security Council by Amb. Warren R. Austin, U.S. representative in the Security Council, on Nov. 15. For texts of the 1st, 2d, 3d, 4th, 5th, 6th, 7th, 8th, 9th, 10th, and 11th reports to the Security Council on U.N. Command operations in Korea, see BULLETIN of Aug. 7, 1950, p. 203; Aug. 28, 1950, p. 323; and Sept. 11, 1950, p. 403; Oct. 2, 1950, p. 534; Oct. 16, 1950, p. 603; Nov. 6, 1950, p. 729; Nov. 13, 1950, p. 759; Jan. 8, 1951, p. 43; and Feb. 19, 1951, p. 304, respectively. Reports nos. 1-11 are published separately as Department of State publications 3935, 3955, 3962, 3978, 3986, 4006, 4015, and 4108, respectively. The 12th, 13th, and 14th reports appear in the BULLETIN of Mar. 19, 1951, p. 470; the 15th and 16th reports in the BULLETIN of Apr. 16, 1951, p. 625; the 17th report in the BULLETIN of Apr. 30, 1951, p. 710; the 18th in the BULLETIN of May 7, 1951, p. 755; a special report by the U.N. Commanding General, in the BULLETIN of May 21, 1951, p. 828; the 19th report in the BULLETIN of June 4, 1951, p. 910; the 20th report in the BULLETIN of June 11, 1951, p. 948; the 21st report in the BULLETIN of July 2, 1951, p. 30; the 22d in the BULLETIN of July 23, 1951, p. 155; the 23d and 24th reports in the BULLETIN of Aug. 13, 1951, p. 265; the 25th report in the BULLETIN of Aug. 20, 1951, p. 303; the 26th report in the BULLETIN of Sept. 24, 1951, p. 510; the 27th report in the BULLETIN of Oct. 29, 1951, p. 709; and the 28th and 29th reports in the BULLETIN of Dec. 24, 1951, p. 1028.

The attacks disclosed well-developed anti-tank defenses. Enemy forces in the Tungdae area gave ground in the face of repeated United Nations attacks until 26 September. Thereafter, the enemy launched a series of counterattacks and succeeded in forcing United Nations Forces back several hundred yards. By the end of the period United Nations Forces had absorbed these attacks and were restoring their positions.

The most significant gains of the period were made on the eastern front in the vicinity of Hoegok. Although the North Korean Forces bitterly defended every hill and elevation and conducted countless counterattacks, the enemy was driven back approximately two miles to the north on a ten-mile front. This action eliminated a major portion of the Hoegok pocket and greatly improved the United Nations lines. United Nations Forces made slight gains in equally heavy fighting to the south and east of Sohul and advanced more than two miles on the extreme east flank. As the period closed, the enemy was making strong efforts to regain lost ground in the Hoegok area.

There was still no clear indication as to when the enemy might undertake a major offensive. There was much activity in rear areas on the western front, and the bulk of the immediately available hostile reserve forces are deployed in rear of that part of the front. A definite increase in the number and strength of hostile probing attacks was noticeable, and the enemy has substantially increased his capabilities for offense or defense. In any case, the enemy is capable of strong offensive action at times of his choosing.

In the past fortnight United Nations Naval forces accelerated the tempo of their attacks against coastal supply arteries on both coasts of Korea. The surface forces were particularly active in night and day bombardment of rail and highway coastal routes, bridges, and important junctions. Standing close in to the beaches in spite of enemy artillery fire, United Nations destroyers, assisted by aerial spotting, silenced Communist gun positions and inflicted heavy losses on enemy troop concentrations and supply activities. The heavier guns of the battleship *New Jersey* and the cruisers *Belfast* and *Toledo* reached far inland to inflict precise destruction on targets reported by aerial observers. United States, British, Australian, and Korean ships of all types including amphibious ships pounded Wonsan with shells and rockets for protracted periods in conjunction with repeated strikes by United Nations Naval aircraft. From the mouth of the Han River north to Chinnampo on the west coast and from the front line position near Kansong north to Chongjin on the east coast, United Nations Naval gunfire exacted a heavy toll of the enemy without damage to any ship. Naval gunfire in support of United Nations Ground Forces operating near the east coast was particularly effective.

Adding to the destruction of the enemy's main supply routes along both coasts, Fireflies and Sea Furies on the carrier *Glory* were prominent in the heavy attacks on Wonsan. Ranging far inland across the front, carrier aircraft repeatedly demonstrated their ability to deliver tactical close air support with deadly accuracy and effectiveness. To the hundreds of known enemy casualties inflicted by the carrier planes must be added damage or destruction of trucks, locomotives, box cars, tunnels and bridges, and endlessly repeated rail and highway cuts that harassed and choked the enemy's internal supply routes. Although confronted by increasingly clever camouflage and dispersal and by much heavier anti-aircraft fire, United Nations pilots relentlessly ferreted out Communist bivouacs and supply dumps as targets for their varied weapons. Marine squadrons based on carriers and Korean airfields concentrated their attacks in close air support on front line troops and night and day strikes against enemy supply routes.

Helicopters operating from the forces afloat continued to perform mine reconnaissance to assist in check mine-sweeping. They also performed spotting, rescue, and supply missions. Ashore United States Marines employed

helicopters for the movement of elements over difficult terrain for the first time in combat. The evacuation of wounded directly from the front lines to hospitals by means of helicopters continued to be a major factor in markedly reducing the percentage of fatalities among the wounded, and there were a number of daring rescues of downed aviators accomplished by these aircraft deep in enemy territory.

United Nations aircraft directed by Far East Air Forces continued air operations at a rate ranging from 800 to 1,000 sorties a day. Low clouds and rain failed to hinder the United Nations effort.

The interdiction program was maintained with continued success. Medium and light bombers and fighter-bombers severely handicapped the movement of Communist supplies by attacking rail lines, marshalling yards, bridges, and other vulnerable points of the main supply routes. The heaviest attack was made when medium bombers struck a single major target with 96 tons of 1,000 pound bombs. Night operations conducted by light bombers and Marine fighter bombers assisted in establishing a new record for damage and destruction of rail and highway rolling stock. The combined effort resulted in the removal of 92 locomotives, 2,007 railroad cars, and 8,060 vehicles from the Communists' rail and highway systems during the period.

Enemy airfields were kept unserviceable through additional attacks made by B-29's. Fighters provided escort and flak suppression as required to permit the successful completion of these missions.

Close support of the United Nations front line forces was rendered by all types of United Nations aircraft. Both visual and radar methods of bombing were employed in striking the enemy's troop concentrations and emplacements near the front lines. The 500 pound air bursting bombs remained one of the most effective weapons in carrying out these close support missions on a round-the-clock basis.

The enemy's opposition to United Nations air operations increased sharply toward the end of the period after having been non-existent for a short time. To counteract this threat, F-84's and Royal Australian Air Force Meteor-8's augmented the F-86's on fighter sweeps in north-western Korea. Despite aggressive attacks by the MIG-15, United Nations aircraft successfully carried out their attacks. Aerial combat, involving from ten to 140 aircraft from both sides, resulted in the destruction of seven MIG-15's and one F-86, and the damage of 19 MIG-15's and four United Nations fighters. Royal Australian Air Force Meteor-8's claimed their first MIG kill since entering the conflict. Combat cargo aircraft maintained their support of the combat units in contact with the enemy, increasing their effort as required by the limited offensives of the ground forces. For the first time since May, ammunition was airlifted from Japan to the forward airfields. The rest and recuperation program continued the air movement of 1,500 combat veterans a day.

The movement, by military necessity, of refugees south from forward combat areas has practically ceased. Revised estimates bring the total refugees at present to 3,500,000 including 425,000 from North Korea. Movement north by refugees in an effort to resettle their homes and work their farms is virtually completed for this season, and all are now attempting to stabilize their situation for the approaching winter season, seeking permanent locations with the help of the governmental and United Nations Civil Assistance Agencies. A limited amount of tentage and supplies for temporary shelter are being provided for refugees by the United Nations Command in view of the coming winter.

Currently, the available quantities of lumber imported under the civil relief program are being distributed from various ports in connection with the rehousing programs in all provinces, especially in Chungchong-Namdo and Kyonggi-Do where greatest devastation occurred last year. A rehabilitation housing project of 100 houses located at Tal Song Gun, five miles north of Taegu, was opened 16 September 1951. Projects such as these serve some-

what to alleviate the acute housing situation. However, the number of refugees needing shelter far outnumbers those that can be provided for in this way. During the past year United Nations members and voluntary agencies have made generous contributions of clothing and blankets. However, these have now been consumed, and there is an urgent need for winter clothing and blankets to meet the requirements for the coming winter.

The Seoul City Government is acutely aware of the dangers of a large increase in the city's population. Every means is now being used to stop further entry into the city. The atmosphere within the city and other parts of Kyonggi-Do province is still quite tense. Against this uneasy background the government and the people continue their efforts toward rehabilitation and reestablishment of their homes and industry. Conditions in the Seoul City Hospital are showing much improvement due to the influence of the Danish nurses and their campaign of instruction there. They have made excellent progress in teaching and training Korean nurses.

There has been a steady decrease over several months in the incidence of communicable disease, which is attributable to the mass immunization program recently completed and the prompt action taken by United Nations Civil Assistance teams when infectious diseases are reported. A new immunization program is scheduled to begin in October. A medical team was dispatched recently to Kurye Gun (Cholla-Namdo province) to render medical aid to a large number of civilians wounded as the result of increased guerrilla attacks in the area.

Doctor Otto Lehner has been accredited to the United Nations Command as the senior delegate of the International Committee of the Red Cross under the provisions of Article 9 of the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War of August 12, 1949. Doctor Lehner arrived in Tokyo on 25 September 1951 and will visit Korea in the near future accompanied by Frederick Bieri, one of the previously accredited International Committee of the Red Cross delegates to the United Nations Command.

During the protracted Communist delay of the armistice discussions United Nations Command leaflets and loud-speaker and radio broadcasts have given wide and regular publicity to Communist frustration of efforts for the restoration of peace. These media have counteracted the enemy's studied attempts to distort the facts and shift to the United Nations Command responsibility for continued delay in progress toward peace. United Nations leaflets and broadcasts disseminated to Chinese and North Korean soldiers have supplied the information denied them by their own officers. Reiterating that the first United Nations objective in Korea is the restoration of peace, these media have constantly reminded enemy soldiers of the futility of sacrificing their lives in any new offensive which the Communists may undertake to launch. They have also emphasized the fundamental friendship of all free nations for the Chinese and the Korean people despite Communist efforts to spread dissension and strife among them.

THIRTY-FIRST REPORT: FOR THE PERIOD OCTOBER 1-15, 1951²

U.N. doc. S/2432
Transmitted December 5, 1951

I herewith submit Report Number 31 of the United Nations Command Operations in Korea for the period 1-15 October, inclusive. United Nations Command Communiqués numbers 1038-1052, inclusive, provide detailed accounts of these operations.

Although no meetings of the delegations took place during this period, some progress was made, through meetings of liaison officers, in establishing proper conditions

² Transmitted to the Security Council by Ambassador Warren R. Austin, U.S. representative in the Security Council, on Dec. 5.

for a resumption of negotiations. On 3 October 1951, Generals Kim Il Sung and Peng Teh-huai replied to my letter of 27 September '51 which proposed Songhyon-Ni as a conference site. Their reply insisted that Kaesong, in Communist-held territory, be kept as the conference site. I replied on 4 October 1951 rejecting Kaesong and requesting the Communist commanders to propose a site between the battle lines. On 7 October '51, Generals Kim and Peng replied proposing Pan Mun Jom as a conference site and further proposing a rectangular neutral zone to include Kaesong and Munsan. Liaison officers met at Pan Mun Jom on the 10th, 11th, 12th, and 14th of October. At the close of the period full agreement between liaison officers on the conditions for resuming the conference had not been reached, but substantial progress had been made.

On 12 October '51, an unfortunate incident occurred. Investigation has established beyond reasonable doubt that United Nations Command jet aircraft made two ground strafing attacks (they dropped no bombs) in the Kaesong area about 1730 hours on the afternoon of 12 October '51, the same aircraft making both attacks. On 14 October '51 in a letter to Generals Kim Il Sung and Peng Teh-huai, I stated that these attacks had been made in violation of United Nations Command standing instructions which specifically direct all units and pilots to avoid attack or overflight of the Kaesong area, that beyond reasonable doubt United Nations jet aircraft had made the attacks, and that the United Nations Command, therefore, accepted responsibility. The United Nations Command will continue to make every effort to prevent any recurrence of incidents which violated previously made agreements.

The enemy attitude continued essentially defensive throughout the period as United Nations Forces applied heavy pressure on various parts of the front in strong local attacks. Although hostile forces offered determined resistance and their front line elements were heavily supported by artillery and mortar fire, they failed to prevent limited United Nations gains in several sectors. United Nations forces continued vigorous reconnaissance and combat patrolling, but most patrols were promptly intercepted by hostile screening forces. A Chinese Communist army relieved a North Korean corps in the Odong sector, extending the Chinese Communist zone of responsibility into the area east of the Pukhan River. Otherwise there were no significant changes in enemy dispositions. Front lines at the close of the period ran northeast from Munsan to Chunggang, thence eastward to Sohul, and northeast to the vicinity of Pohang.

On the western front, United Nations forces initiated strong limited objective attacks on the twenty-mile front from Kigong to Orijong. In the Kigong sector, the enemy resisted with great determination from 3 to 9 October but made no decisive attempts to recover lost ground thereafter. In this action, the United Nations line advanced three to four miles westward to the immediate vicinity of Kigong. Fighting for high ground to the south and east of Orijong began on 1 October and continued to twelve days. The enemy bitterly contested every United Nations advance and mounted repeated counterattacks, some of which were temporarily successful.

During these operations a number of United Nations Command units distinguished themselves in action against the enemy.

The 15th Infantry of the 3rd Infantry Division in an attack characterized by aggressiveness and superb coordination captured the key hill 487 on 29 September '51. The capture of hill 487 afforded an excellent wedge into enemy defenses along line Jamestown, objective of operations, COMMANDO. On 3 October, in coordination with the 1st Cavalry Division on its left, the 15th Infantry attacked west along the ridge running west from hill 487 to hill 477. The enemy tenaciously defended this ridge line from well prepared bunkers and emplacements, and only through a very aggressive attack with excellent coordination of all supporting units was the 15th Infantry able to wrest this key position from the enemy and inflict heavy losses on the Communist forces.

The key terrain to line Jamestown in the right portion of the 1st Cavalry Division zone was the hill mass dominated by hills 313, 347, and 418. In the left of the zone, the critical terrain was hill 346, the ridge extending north-east therefrom and hill 287 on the north of the ridge. The 7th Cavalry with the Greek Battalion attached and the 8th Cavalry with the Thailand Battalion attached shared equally in the success of the operation. The capture of hills 313, 347, and 418 was a combined effort of elements of the 7th and 8th Cavalry Regiments and the Greek Battalion which took hill 313. The enemy fought stubbornly in this area and launched strong counterattacks. The bitter and determined battle fought by our troops resulted not only in the capture of the hills but also hundreds of enemy casualties.

The 1st Commonwealth Division made its main effort on the right against hills 238 and 355. The nature of the enemy defense and the characteristics of the manner in which he conducted his defense was much the same as that found in the 1st Cavalry Division zone. Some of the heaviest artillery and mortar fire so far employed by the enemy was received by the attack element, and the enemy launched vicious and fanatical counterattacks in an effort to halt the drive. Despite the all-out efforts of the enemy the attack was successfully pressed and completely defeated the enemy, inflicting heavy casualties and forcing the withdrawal of his decimated forces.

The nature of the enemy defense encountered in the above operation indicated that he planned to hold his position at all costs. Bunkers varying in size from very small to large enough to hold approximately a hundred men were reduced. The ridges were rimmed with deep, connecting, and sometimes covered trenches. Artillery positions were found in caves dug into the sides of hills. In spite of all Communist preparations, the persistent efforts in conducting the attacks on D Day by elements of the British, Cavalry, and 3rd Divisions succeeded in forcing the enemy to give up his extremely well prepared positions. Before yielding to the attack, the enemy lost 2,500 counted killed, and additional 500 estimated killed, 20,000 estimated wounded, and 427 prisoners of war to the combined air, artillery, and infantry weapons of the attacking troops. Much of the fighting, particularly near the tops of hills and ridges, was at grenade range and bayonet point.

The aggressiveness, fortitude, outstanding leadership, and excellent coordination with which these units conducted this operation brought about the early success of the attack and resulted in advancing the United Nations line in these zones from three to four miles. The seizing of the assigned objective secured terrain dominating the avenues of approach which had been successfully utilized by the enemy in the past and denies to him the use of important assembly areas for future attack against our forces.

On the thirty-mile central front from Chunggang to the Pukhan River, action was confined to patrolling and local probing during most of the period. On 12 October, United Nations forces attacked on a ten-mile front south of Haso and Chiktong and made moderate initial gains against variable resistance. Although the enemy is believed to have disposed one of his densest masses of artillery behind this sector, the bulk of his defensive fires were directed against United Nations artillery positions. Hitherto, nearly all hostile artillery fire has been directed against attacking infantry troops.

The most intense action of the period took place on a twenty-mile sector of the eastern front immediately to the east of the Pukhan River. Fighting was virtually continuous in a bitter contest for high ground to the south of Amdong and Tupo. In one instance, United Nations forces fought for six days, from 6 through 11 October, to take a hill in the Amdong area; and elsewhere substantial enemy forces counterattacked repeatedly to retake dominating heights. Toward the end of the period, however, the hostile defenses showed signs of weakening, and United Nations forces on the Amdong-Tupo front succeeded in pushing one to three miles northward.

Although the enemy retains the capability of reverting to the offensive at any time of his choosing, his attitude at the close of the period was predominantly defensive. It is apparent that he is prepared for continued hostilities in that he has issued winter uniforms and has continued to maintain a high level in troop strength, training of reserves and replacements. He has continued to replace losses in combat units and has continued the periodic relief of exhausted units on the front. The steady volume of heavy traffic in the hostile rear indicates a strong effort to maintain high levels of supplies in forward areas. The preponderance of hostile reserves is still disposed in rear of the western front.

During the first two weeks of October, United Nations naval units bombarded enemy coastal positions and traffic arteries along the Korean seaboard from the front lines far to the north. On the west coast gun positions within thirty miles of the mouth of the Yalu were shelled by a British destroyer, while twenty miles up the Han River New Zealand and Australian frigates continued to pound enemy concentrations. On the east coast, surface ships methodically hammered bridges and rail and highway junctions from Kosong north to Chongjin. Surface striking forces steamed into Hungnam harbor to deliver the heaviest attacks on that Communist port since United Nations forces were withdrawn last December. The siege of Wonsan was continued and a British task group struck the Kojo area. In spite of increasing return fire from enemy coast artillery, no major casualties or damage to ships was received from this source although the United States Destroyer *Earnest G. Small* was damaged and suffered 27 casualties when she struck a mine. An enemy jet strafing and bombing attack on the Destroyer *Twining* resulted in no damage, but was notable as the first air attack on a naval unit in many months.

Carrier aircraft including Australian Sea Furies and Fireflies, Marine Corsairs, Skyraiders, and Banshee and Panther jets concentrated the majority of their attacks on inland transportation routes and equipment, inflicting heavy losses on the enemy and smashing bridges, tunnels, warehouses, and marshalling yards with bombs and rockets. Close air support night-heckler missions and attacks on troop centres in the mountainous interior filled out the schedules of the carrier forces.

Shore-based Marine aircraft devoted their major effort to close air support but also carried out such varied missions as interdiction, night flare drops, and laying telephone lines from helicopters. Night and day operations were launched to add steadily to lengthening enemy casualty lists.

Assisted by helicopter spotting the smaller naval surface units continued check mine sweeping and interception of the occasional enemy small craft that attempted to penetrate the United Nations blockade. Although frequently subjected to heavy fire, they carried out dozens of useful tasks close in to the enemy beaches. Patrol boats and helicopters on several occasions gallantly rescued pilots shot down in hostile territory and surrounded by the enemy. A number of floating mines along both coasts of North Korea were detected and sunk.

United Nations land-based aircraft under the direction of the Far East Air Forces increased slightly their rate of air activity during the current period. Primary emphasis was placed on close support of the ground forces in their new offensives and on the current interdiction programme which has been in progress for over a month. Additional air operations included airlift, counter air, reconnaissance, flare and leaflet drops, and other specialized missions. Aircraft and crews from South Africa, Thailand, Australia, Greece, and the Republic of Korea, as well as the United States Air Force and the United States Marine Corps participated.

Close air support was rendered to the United Nations ground units in contact with the enemy by an average of seventy-five fighter aircraft a day. During daylight hours fighter bombers used napalm, rockets, bombs, and machine gun fire to neutralize targets designated by ground and

airborne tactical air control parties. At night, targets adjacent to the front lines were attacked by light and medium bombers, thus permitting the enemy no respite. These attacks materially reduced the enemy's resistance to friendly advances.

The interdiction program, designed to reduce to a minimum the forward flow of enemy supplies, continued as a highlight of Korean air activities and was carried out on a round-the-clock basis. Hundreds of fighter bombers and light and medium bombers joined in the program by attacking supply dumps, marshalling yards, vehicle parks, bottle-necked traffic, and rail and highway bridges, as well as rail lines, rolling stock, and vehicles. The effectiveness of the program is indicated by the enemy's strenuous efforts to prevent the complete disruption of his transportation networks. Specific indications are the redeployment of anti-aircraft defenses to key communications facilities, a shift in the pattern and route of night truck traffic, cannibalization of rail lines, and heavy redeployment and commitment of labor forces to the affected areas.

Counter-air operations continued throughout the period with medium bombers striking North Korean airfields daily. Combat air patrols over northwestern Korea resulted in the destruction and damage of many enemy aircraft and permitted the medium bombers and fighter bombers to operate with relative freedom although the versatile fighter bombers on occasion were required to release their bombs prematurely in order to counter attacks by enemy jets. Additional defense was provided United Nations bombers by fighters which made flak suppression strikes against anti-aircraft installations in the vicinity of the objective areas.

Aerial combat accounted for the destruction or damage of over thirty-five MIG-15 aircraft. Ground fire from enemy troops and aerial combat resulted in the loss or damage of approximately twenty-five United Nations aircraft. The prompt and efficient action of air rescue personnel resulted in the saving of many crews from capture by the enemy.

Combat cargo aircraft lifted over 35,000 personnel, evacuated 4,500 sick and wounded personnel, and moved 4,500 tons of freight and supplies.

Pursuant to the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, a continuously expanding program of intellectual, recreational, and vocational opportunities is being provided prisoners of war by the United Nations Command. Thousands of illiterates are learning to read and write their own language. Through the media of radio broadcasts and motion pictures, increasing numbers of prisoners are learning something of the outside world. Entertainment is furnished not only by radio programs and movies, but also in the form of plays and programs written and produced by the prisoners themselves. There is increasing interest in vocational training and in the production of items to improve camp facilities. The construction of permanent type winter housing has employed a large number of prisoners, both skilled and unskilled. Other large-scale vocational projects are under way.

Since the beginning of the Korean operation and the break-out from the Pusan perimeter, much has been accomplished in the public health and welfare field for the civilian population of Korea. Extensive medical facilities have been developed for not only the destitute but also for the use of the general population.

At the present time there are 93 hospitals and 343 dispensaries operating under the direction of United Nations Civil Assistance Command. The current average load is 8,516 in-patients and 22,790 out-patients.

The new fiscal year 1952 immunization program will commence shortly and shipment of smallpox and typhus vaccines to Korea will begin 15 October 1951.

Member nations and voluntary relief agencies have made generous contributions during the past year. However, additional supplies are needed to meet coming winter conditions.

THIRTY-SECOND REPORT: FOR THE PERIOD OCTOBER 16-31, 1951¹

U.N. doc. S/2469
Transmitted Jan. 5, 1952

I herewith submit report number 32 of the United Nations Command Operations in Korea for the period 16-31 October, inclusive. United Nations Command Communiqués numbers 1038-1053, inclusive, provide detailed accounts of these operations.

Some progress was made in negotiating a military armistice during the period. On 22 October 1951 liaison officers of the United Nations Command and Communist forces signed an agreement which specified terms of resumption of armistice negotiations. On this same date the senior delegate for the United Nations Command ratified the agreement by forwarding signed copies of it to the Communist delegation. On 23 October 1951 the Communist delegation in turn ratified the agreement. The text of the agreement and the mutually accepted understandings with respect to the agreement follow:

Text of the agreement:

1. The specific site at which the conference of the delegations will be resumed in the vicinity of Pan Mun Jom is indicated on the attached map.

2. The conference site area is a circular area having a radius of 1,000 yards centered on the conference site as shown on the attached map.

3. No hostile acts of any kind shall be carried out by any armed force of either side, including all regular and irregular units and armed individuals of the ground, naval and air forces, against the conference site area as defined above.

4. Except for the military police provided for below, no armed personnel of either side shall be permitted in the conference site area. Designated officers of both sides shall be jointly responsible for the security and the preservation of order within the conference site area. Each side shall provide a military police detachment of 2 officers and 15 men to assist in the performance of these duties while the delegation parties are present in the conference site area. During periods when the delegation parties are not present in the conference site area, 1 officer and 5 men of the military police from each side will be stationed in the conference site area. The military police shall carry only small arms, namely pistols, rifles and carbines.

5. Both delegations and their parties shall have free access to, and free movement within the Pan Mun Jom conference site area. The composition of each delegation party shall be as determined by the senior delegate thereof.

6. Physical facilities and communication and administrative arrangements with respect to the negotiations and the conference site area will be as agreed upon by the liaison officers of both sides. The delegation of the Korean Peoples Army and the Chinese Peoples Volunteers will be responsible for providing a suitable joint facility for use as a meeting place of the delegations and for the arrangements within the conference room. Except for this installation, each delegation will provide its own facilities.

7. All armed forces of both sides, including all regular and irregular units and armed individuals of the ground, naval and air forces, shall refrain from hostile acts of any kind against the circular area having a radius of 3 miles centered on the traffic circle at Kaesong, against the camp area of the United Nations Command Delegation contained within a circle having a radius of 3 miles centered as indicated on the attached map, and against the area of 200 metres to either side of the Kaesong-Pan Mun Jom-Munsan road as indicated on the attached map. Text of mutually accepted understandings with respect to the agreement:

¹ Transmitted to the Security Council by Amb. Warren R. Austin, U.S. representative in the Security Council, on Jan. 5.

1. The term armed forces as used in the agreement includes only the armed units and armed individuals under the control of or prompted either overtly or covertly by either side. When the factual findings of joint investigation prove beyond reasonable doubt that the persons responsible for an incident are under the control of or prompted either overtly or covertly by either side, that side shall not evade its responsibility for the incident.

2. Investigation of reported violations of agreements shall be conducted as has been the practice of the liaison officers in the past.

3. Agreements reached between the liaison officers on matters concerning the resumption of the armistice conference by the delegations will be the draft of the related part of the agreement of over-all arrangements to be stipulated by the delegations for the entire duration of the armistice negotiations.

4. All previous security agreements and agreements regarding the Kaesong conference site area and neutral zone are superseded by the agreement of security arrangements for the entire duration of the armistice negotiations when the latter agreement is stipulated by the delegations of both sides.

5. Except under weather and technical conditions beyond control, the military aircraft of both sides shall not fly over the conference site area at Pan Mun Jom; the military aircraft of the United Nations Command shall not fly over the Kaesong area and the area of the road from there to the conference site area at Pan Mun Jom; the military aircraft of the Korean Peoples Army and Chinese Peoples Volunteers shall not fly over the Munsan area and the area of the road from there to the conference site area at Pan Mun Jom.

The delegations met on 25 October. This was the first meeting since the Communists suspended negotiations on 22 August. It was agreed to resume sub-delegation meetings for the purpose of discussing agenda item 2, the demilitarized zone. As of 31 October 1951, sub-delegation meetings continue.

The enemy remained on the defensive throughout the period. He was liberal in the use of artillery and mortars, and intercepted nearly all United Nations reconnaissance patrols. Occasionally he put up vigorous, sustained resistance to local United Nations attacks, and held United Nations forces to relatively minor gains except in the Kumsong area and to the east of the Pukhan River. There was no significant change in enemy strength or dispositions. At the close of the period the line of contact ran generally northeast from Haechang through Pan Mun Jom to the vicinity of Orijong, thence eastward through Chungdong to Kumsong, east and south to Pyonam, east to Schui and northeast to Kosong.

On the western front the enemy continued to be particularly sensitive in the sector immediately northeast of Otan. Patrol clashes were numerous and local fighting was particularly vigorous on the 10-mile sector from Otan to Orijong. In this area hostile patrols made numerous probing attacks. United Nations forces attempting to seize some high ground to their immediate front in the area south and southeast of Chungdong met stiff resistance punctuated by sharp counterattacks, but overpowered the hostile troops and seized their objectives.

The most noteworthy operation on the central front was a United Nations advance of 5 miles on a 10-mile front south of Kumsong, which, by 23 October, had carried our forces to a general east-west line about a mile south of the town. The Colombian Battalion, first South American ally in Korea, was also the first UN element into the town of Kumsong. On 26 October this battalion's fine performance was commended by the Commanding General Eighth Army. Thereafter, patrols reconnoitered in the Urban area. Hostile delaying action against this attack followed a variable pattern of resistance. During this advance the Second and Sixth Republic of Korea Divisions performed with distinction. Their well co-ordinated aggressive attacks resulted in heavy enemy casualties and

the capture of large numbers of enemy personnel. The professional skill of these Republic of Korea Divisions is attested by their comparatively light casualties during the operation. Farther to the right, south of Talchon, the enemy fought stubbornly throughout the period, but by 28 October, hard-driving United Nations forces succeeded in matching the 5-mile advance of the troops on their left. During the fighting in the Kumsong area the performance of the 38th United States Infantry Regiment and the Netherlands Battalion, Second United States Infantry Division, was outstanding. Elsewhere on the central front, both sides patrolled extensively. As the period closed, hostile forces were extremely sensitive to United Nations reconnaissance patrols.

Action on the eastern front was primarily confined to intensive patrolling, as United Nations combat patrols maintained continuous pressure on hostile screening forces. The enemy exhibited great determination in his attempt to intercept and turn back all United Nations probing forces. Sharp local fights took place to the south of Mulgiji and to the south and southeast of Chongsong. In the Mulgiji area, bitterly resisting hostile forces were driven 2 to 3 miles northward by 29 October. Resistance in the Chongsong area held United Nations forces to minor gains, and heavy fighting continued at the close of the period. On the east coast United Nations forces advanced to the vicinity of Kosong.

Although the hostile attitude remained primarily defensive, and enemy forces on the central front appear to have been caught off-balance by our limited objective attacks there, the enemy still retains a powerful potential for offensive action. He continues to hold a heavy mass of reserves behind his western front. Front line units have maintained a generally defensive attitude, and have made no serious efforts to retake ground lost to United Nations forces in recent months. Prisoners of war still speak vaguely of a "Sixth phase offensive," but no longer specify a date for it. At the same time, the enemy continues his strenuous effort to maintain the combat strength and fire power of units on the line of contact.

In the last 2 weeks of October United Nations Naval Forces, including ships of 9 nations, continued to effectively blockade the coasts of North Korea, and bombarded troop concentrations, transportation routes and supply centres within range of their guns. Bridges, shore batteries, and enemy soldiers suffered damage from the rain of projectiles directed by ground and air observers. Close Naval support gunfire took a steady toll of the enemy at both ends of the battle line, while at Wonsan and Hungnam essential Communist supply activities were able to continue operations only by accepting continuous severe losses of personnel and equipment. A gauge of the effect of this constant harassment is the enemy's determined effort to drive off the attacking ships with increased numbers of heavy calibre shore batteries, as evidence by battle damage inflicted on USS *Helena*, USS *Ulvert M. Moore* and Republic of Korea Heavy Frigate *Apnok*. Casualties were light on the damaged ships, and attacking surface units accepted the counterfire as a measure of the enemy reaction to their efforts, which, to a limited extent, relieved United Nations soldiers all across the front from Communist artillery fire.

Naval and Marine Air units flying from carriers and shore bases intensified their strikes to interdict the enemy's supplies, and methodically blasted rail lines, bridges, tunnels, rolling stock, truck convoys, and supply dumps in northeastern and western Korea. Enemy gun positions, bunkers, and exposed troops across the battle-front received napalm, bomb, rocket and strafing attacks delivered in close support of United Nations ground forces. In addition to evacuating wounded, rescuing pilots and small units isolated in enemy territory, and spotting enemy dispositions, the helicopters successfully undertook a sizeable combat air resupply mission, and an aerial wrecker service for the first time during this period. An inconclusive air encounter near Suncheon between Marine Panther Jets and MIG-15's was noteworthy

as evidence of increasing aggressiveness on the part of the Communist fighters.

Patrolling vessels, including most of the smaller units, destroyed a number of enemy sampans and fishing vessels, and detected and destroyed moored and floating mines. They also recovered downed air crews and performed a multitude of other varied and important missions. Worthy of special mention was the daring recovery of a pilot in Hungnam Harbour by the USS *Conway* when the destroyer steamed, boldly and alone, within range of enemy shore batteries to complete a speedy rescue.

United Nations aircraft under the Far East Air Forces continued high sortie rates, flying approximately 15,000 sorties during the period, despite limiting factors of seasonal fogs and of a few days of poor weather induced by a typhoon in the area. The highlights of air activities were the increased enemy counter air operations, the neutralization of 3 airfields in northwest Korea, and numerous exploits of air rescue units.

Enemy air opposition, rising from bases in Manchuria, was the heaviest yet encountered in northwestern Korea over a prolonged period. Except for the days of typhoon weather, our aircraft daily encountered an average of 150 jet planes seeking to protect the enemy's remaining air, rail and highway facilities north and west of Pyongyang. Our claims for the period are 16 MIG's destroyed and 41 damaged, all in air-to-air combat; the most successful single day was 16 October when 10 MIG's were destroyed and 5 damaged. The enemy's anti-aircraft defenses are continuously increasing with present estimates of his AAA strength being nearly 400 guns and over 1,400 automatic weapons.

The neutralization of airfields in North Korea was marked by medium bomber attacks on jet airfields at Samcham, Taechon, and Namsi where new construction progress had been under observation by aerial reconnaissance for over a month. Nearly 100 air landing facilities in North Korea are under continuous surveillance to determine when and to what extent the fields are being made operable. Heavy anti-aircraft fire at Taechon downed 1 medium bomber and, on the Namsi attack, MIG-15's from across the Yalu inflicted considerable damage and some losses upon the bomber force.

Fighter bomber and night intruder attacks continued to be directed toward interdiction of enemy logistics capabilities. 70 locomotives and 1,200 rail cars were destroyed or damaged, principally in the areas from Sinanju north to the border, and over 3,000 vehicles were destroyed. Rail cuts were accomplished in over 1,300 places while 112 bridges were damaged.

Combat Cargo Units mounted over 3,200 sorties, lifting more than 5,600 tons of cargo and 48,000 personnel including 6,234 sick and wounded.

This period saw the rescue of 29 airmen from deep within enemy territory. On 22 October all 12 crew members of the B-29 hit by flak over Taechon bailed out and in less than one hour were recovered by United Nations Command aircraft. This example is typical of the splendid search and rescue operations which have been performed in Korea. Since hostilities began, Far East Air Forces rescue aircraft have recovered more than 700 United Nations personnel from behind enemy lines and evacuated nearly 2,500 critical medical cases from rugged terrain where conventional transport was impossible or impractical.

There were no air attacks on United Nations Command ground installations during the period.

On the occasion of United Nations Day, 24 October, and during the weeks preceding and following, United Nations Command leaflets and radio broadcasts devoted particular attention to explaining the United Nations and its objectives. This opportunity was taken for restatement of the fundamental position of the United Nations Command in the Armistice discussions, and for reiteration of its mission of repelling Communist aggression and restoring international peace and security in the area. With

the resumption of Armistice discussions late in October, continuing efforts were made by the United Nations Command to disseminate as widely as possible, through leaflets and broadcasts, an accurate and objective explanation of the points at issue and the United Nations stand on them.

U.N. Working Party To Study Insecticide Shortages

[Released to the press February 5]

The international action necessary to alleviate the present critical shortage of insecticides required for public-health purposes is to be the subject of study by a Working Party which has been established by the Secretary-General of the United Nations and which is to meet at Geneva, Switzerland, on February 11, 1952.

Earl R. Beckner, chief, Chemicals and Semi-Manufactured Products Branch, Manufactured Products Staff, Department of State, has been designated to serve as United States representative on the Working Party.

Louis N. Markwood, director, Chemical Division, Department of Commerce, will serve as adviser to the United States representative.

At the fourth World Health Assembly in May 1951, it was pointed out that (1) the use of insecticides for the control and eventual eradication of certain communicable diseases had been adopted by many countries as integral and major parts of their total efforts to improve both the health and economic standards of large proportions of their populations; (2) the efficacy of control measures and the eventual conquest of insect-borne diseases was dependent upon the regular and adequate provision of the insecticides required; and (3) the availability of such insecticides had been sharply affected by the shortage of raw materials (chlorine, benzene, sulphuric acid) resulting from altered production priorities in connection with the development of defense programs in the major producing countries. The fourth World Health Assembly adopted a resolution in which governments were requested to take vigorous action to maintain capacity production of insecticides and to facilitate their export, and in which the United Nations was requested to investigate the international aspects of the problem.

Acting upon this request, the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations on September 4, 1951, directed the Secretary-General of the United Nations to establish a Working Party to study the problem.

U.S. Delegations to International Conferences

Scientific Liaison

On February 6, the Department of State announced that J. Wallace Joyce, deputy science adviser, has been designated to represent the U.S. Government as an observer at the British Commonwealth Scientific Official Conference which is to be held at Canberra and Melbourne, Australia, during the period February 18 through March 7, 1952.

The primary purpose of the Conference will be to enable the top-ranking official scientists of the British Commonwealth countries to consider ways and means of insuring the fullest possible collaboration among the civil government scientific organizations of the Commonwealth. It is anticipated that, by virtue of the attendance of a U.S. observer at the Conference, closer and more extensive liaison will be established between the scientists of the United States and of the British Commonwealth countries.

Prominent among the items which are to be considered at the Conference are (1) the development of scientific liaison offices; (2) scientific representation abroad; (3) methods of Commonwealth collaboration in science; (4) relations with international organizations; and (5) information and abstracting services. The participants will also discuss the reports of several specialized Commonwealth scientific conferences and the methods used in several Commonwealth countries for applying the results of official scientific research.

IRO Meetings

On February 7 the Department of State announced that the President has designated George L. Warren,¹ Adviser on Refugees and Displaced Persons, Bureau of United Nations Affairs, to serve as U.S. representative at meetings of two organs of the International Refugee Organization (IRO) which are to be held at Geneva, the eleventh session of the Executive Committee, beginning on February 7, and the ninth session of the General Council, beginning on February 11.

Mr. Warren will be assisted at the meetings by the following Advisers:

Donald C. Blaisdell, U.S. representative for Specialized Agency Affairs, Geneva, Switzerland.

Michael A. Farrell, chief, Displaced Persons Branch, Office of the U.S. High Commissioner for Austria, Vienna.

¹ On Feb. 2, the President appointed George L. Warren to be U.S. representative on the Provisional Intergovernmental Committee for the Movement of Migrants from Europe.

Guy J. Swope, chief, Displaced Populations Division, Office of the U.S. High Commissioner for Germany, Frankfurt.

John Z. Williams, assistant chief, Displaced Populations Division, Office of the U.S. High Commissioner for Germany, Frankfurt.

The Executive Committee and the General Council of the Iro will be concerned at their forthcoming meetings with the approval of plans for the final liquidation of the Organization, which has been in existence since July 1947 and which since that time has resettled more than one million displaced persons and refugees in new homes and repatriated nearly 73,000 to their home countries. Among the specific agenda items to be considered by both bodies are (1) the semiannual report of the Director General for the period July 1-December 31, 1951; (2) financial reports for the 3 months ended September 30, 1951, and proposals or further financial reports; (3) a final plan of expenditure; (4) a report by the Director General on outstanding operational problems as of February 1, 1952; and (5) a report by the Director General on the liquidation of the Organization.

Check List of Department of State Press Releases: Feb. 4-9, 1952

Releases may be obtained from the Office of the Special Assistant for Press Relations, Department of State, Washington 25, D. C. Items marked (*) are not printed in the BULLETIN; items marked (†) will appear in a future issue.

No.	Date	Subject
69	1/25	Brown: Mobilizing materials
82	1/30	Vincent testimony before Senate
84	1/30	U.N. drafts cartels agreement
89	1/31	Fisher: U.S. role in world affairs
93*	2/4	Anniversary of Ceylon
94	2/4	Cultural program intensified
95	2/5	Insecticide shortage
96†	2/6	Linder: Duties on tuna imports
97	2/6	Acheson: Death of King George VI
98	2/6	Scientific conference
99	2/7	Thorp to Sen. Ferguson on Imc
100	2/7	Cady: Point 4 director at Colombia
101†	2/9	Mexican labor agreement
102	2/7	Kennan: Ambassador to U.S.S.R.
103	2/7	Warren: Iro representative
104†	2/7	Cowen: NATO accomplishments
105	2/7	Relief and rehabilitation exports
106*	2/7	Frederick Larkin retires

THE DEPARTMENT

Point Four Appointments

John R. Neale, Albion W. Patterson, John L. Hummel, George J. Greco, and John K. Chattey as country directors of technical cooperation in Peru, Paraguay, Honduras, Dominican Republic, and Nicaragua respectively.

Charles Preston Blanks, Ernest C. Jeppsen, and Vance Rogers as country directors for Ecuador, Panama, and Haiti, respectively.

John C. Cady as country director of technical cooperation for Colombia.

Samuel S. Stratton as country director of technical cooperation in Saudi Arabia, effective February 1.

Louis Henry Rohrbaugh as country director of technical cooperation in Iraq, effective January 9.

THE FOREIGN SERVICE

John Carter Vincent Repudiates Pro-Communist Allegations¹

[Released to the press January 30]

Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee:

I have requested an opportunity to meet with you for two reasons. First, to repudiate under oath certain irresponsible but very grave allegations made against me before this Committee and secondly, to give the Committee whatever other assistance I may in the conduct of its investigation.

On August 23, 1951, before this Subcommittee, Mr. Morris asked a witness, Louis Budenz, the following question:

"Mr. Budenz, was John Carter Vincent a member of the Communist Party?"

Mr. Budenz replied: "From official reports I have received, he was." Insofar as the printed record shows, Mr. Budenz did not produce or describe the "official reports" to which he referred.

Later Mr. Morris again inquired:

"Mr. Budenz, is it your testimony that it was an official Communist Party secret shared by few people that at that time John Carter Vincent was a member of the Communist Party?"

"Yes, Sir," replied Mr. Budenz.

Mr. Budenz also testified that I was described "as being in line with the Communist viewpoint,

seeing eye to eye with it." When questioned as to his source, he answered: "that was stated by Communist officials in the Politburo at that time, by Mr. Browder and Mr. Jack Stachel."

I have never met either Browder or Stachel, but it is pertinent to recall that Mr. Browder testified before the Tydings Committee that he knew of no connection that I had with the Communist Party either directly or indirectly.

On October 5, 1951, Mr. Budenz again appeared before the Subcommittee.

Mr. Morris asked: "Mr. Budenz, have you identified John Carter Vincent to be a member of the Communist Party before this Committee?"

Mr. Budenz replied: "Yes, Sir, from official communications."

Later, during this same hearing, Mr. Morris said that "Mr. Budenz reported to me, as a Naval Intelligence Officer, the fact that John Carter Vincent was a member of the Communist Party, and I made a report on that fact."

Gentlemen, anyone, including Budenz, who before this Subcommittee or anywhere else, testifies that I was at any time a member of the Communist Party is bearing false witness; he is, to put it bluntly, lying. I do not pretend to know what motives guide Mr. Budenz. In my own case, his motives seem to be clearly malicious. He has endeavored before this Subcommittee to support his allegations by strained suggestion and devious insinuation.

Now, Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee—I am not a Communist and have never been a member of the Communist Party. I have never sympathized with the aims of communism. On the contrary, I have worked loyally throughout the 27 years of my Foreign Service career in the interest of our own Government and people. I am strongly attached to the principle of representative democracy and to our system of free enterprise. These being the facts, the members of the Committee will appreciate, I am sure, how disagreeable it is for me to find it necessary to affirm my devotion to our democratic institutions because of unfounded allegations made by Budenz or anyone else.

We cannot dismiss the Budenz testimony as a "mistake." Any attempt through malicious testimony to cause the American people to lose confidence in their officials, or in each other, is in itself subversive to the interests and security of our country. When, as in my case, the official represents his country abroad, the effect may be doubly harmful.

I am in full accord with the objectives of this subcommittee. The internal security of the United States, now probably more than ever before in our history, is vitally important to all of us. Our American way of life is threatened from within as well as from without. But we cannot, as I wrote you, Mr. Chairman on November 9th,²

¹ Statement made before the Senate Subcommittee on Internal Security on Jan. 30.

² BULLETIN of Dec. 3, 1951, p. 922.

defend democracy with perfidy or defeat communism with lies. And I wish to state, not as an official of our Government who has been falsely accused, but as a citizen who is deeply concerned for the welfare and security of his country, that irresponsible testimony, such as Mr. Budenz is wont to give, might have its use in a totalitarian state but has no place in our American democracy.

Mr. Budenz has made other allegations concerning me which are equally untrue though less material. Other witnesses have appeared before your Committee and made statements concerning me which are factually incorrect. Mr. Eugene Dooman's testimony concerning the formulation of a postwar surrender policy for Japan is most inaccurate; in fact, some of the policies which Mr. Dooman charges that I formulated were actually formulated under his chairmanship of the committee dealing with the problem, or by govern-

mental agencies in which I had no responsibility. Admiral Cooke's testimony about my attitude toward making available certain ammunition to the Nationalist Government of China is in error. I wish to assure you that I am prepared to discuss and correct all such testimony and discuss any other issues which this Committee may wish to consider.

But, Gentlemen, my main purpose in seeking an opportunity to come before you has been accomplished. At the Subcommittee Hearings of October 5, 1951, Senator Smith is reported as saying: "Mr. Vincent should come here and challenge Mr. Budenz' statement and say 'I am not a Communist'. That draws the issue."

Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee, I now solemnly repeat:

I am not and never have been a Communist. I so draw the issue.

Senate Resolution Endorses European Federation

EXCHANGE OF LETTERS WITH THE PRESIDENT

Senators Fulbright, McMahon, and Sparkman to the President

JANUARY 30, 1952.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: AS you know, since becoming Members of the United States Senate, our efforts have been directed toward the establishment and maintenance of peace and the preservation of the dignity of man. In order to be fully equipped to make the maximum contribution toward the achievement of this end, we have given constant study and consideration both to political and economic history and to the possible solutions to the many problems confronting those people of the world desiring peace and freedom.

We have discussed these questions with our colleagues and with many of the leading statesmen of the world. We have long been convinced and, are now more firmly convinced than ever, that the creation of a political federation in Europe would be a great contribution—in fact, a necessary step—toward the achievement of these objectives.

The will to achieve federation is present among the people of Europe, as well as among their statesmen and their leaders. We believe the necessity is felt. This Government has taken positive steps to encourage, indeed to facilitate, such a federation. The Congress has manifested in legislation over the past several years its interest in European unity. What is now needed is a clear statement by this Government formally declaring

its sympathy for the creation of a political federation in Europe. We should encourage the European countries to call a constitutional convention to lay the groundwork for European political federation at the earliest possible date.

With this in mind, we intend to introduce the attached resolution in the United States Senate. It is our sincere hope that you will find it possible to lend it your support and encouragement.

Respectfully yours,

J. WILLIAM FULBRIGHT,
United States Senator.
BRIEN MCMAHON,
United States Senator.
JOHN J. SPARKMAN,
United States Senator.

The President to Senators Fulbright, McMahon, and Sparkman

JANUARY 30, 1952¹

DEAR SENATORS: I have your letter advising me of your intention to introduce a resolution designed to bring about a declaration by this Government of its sympathy for the early creation, within the framework of the North Atlantic community, of a political federation in Europe.

I believe such a declaration would do much to encourage our European friends to move ahead vigorously toward this objective. I believe sin-

¹ Printed from *Cong. Rec.* of Jan. 31, p. 690.

cerely that the creation of a political federation in Europe, uniting the strength of free peoples on that continent, would be one of the greatest contributions that could be made toward the advancement of freedom and the maintenance of peace.

It is my hope that the United States Senate will give this resolution its careful consideration and its wholehearted approval.

Sincerely yours,

HARRY S. TRUMAN.

STATEMENTS BY SPONSORS¹

Senator Fulbright

Mr. President, I consider this to be a very historic resolution. For centuries some of the wisest men in the world have advocated the political unification of Europe. Many of the bloodiest wars, particularly the two world wars in which we have been involved, have grown out of the friction which has resulted from the political and economic fragmentation of Europe. So this resolution we are advocating is not an idealistic dream. The European leaders themselves are taking the lead and are making progress toward the economic integration of their countries, as proved by the adoption of the Schuman plan only a few days ago by the legislature of Western Germany.

Mr. President, I am very pleased, indeed, that the President of the United States has given his strong approval to the resolution. In my opinion, it is one of the most hopeful and farsighted policies he has ever supported.

Senator McMahon

Mr. President, I appreciate the cooperative spirit which has been evidenced by the chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations in this matter. I hope the committee will be able to consider the resolution very quickly, because it is a matter of the first importance. I came firmly to that conclusion after attending the meeting at Strasbourg of the 14 Members of Congress who convened with the delegates of the European Consultative Assembly for a 5-day meeting.

This resolution, if adopted, would place the Senate on record in favor of the immediate calling of a constitutional assemblage in Europe for the purpose of bringing about a United States of

Europe, which means the political, economic, and military unification of that continent. I say to the Senate that unless that is achieved, we shall not be able to relieve ourselves of the burden which we are now carrying.

TEXT OF RESOLUTION²

WHEREAS it is now well recognized, both here and abroad, that many past wars, including the two World Wars, have had as one of their underlying causes political disunity in Europe; and

WHEREAS a vast majority of the statesmen of the Western World now agree that further European unity is vital to the economic and military security of the free world; and

WHEREAS it is the policy of this Government to encourage all measures looking toward the closer association of the European nations; and

WHEREAS this Government has already taken positive steps, such as the enactment of the European recovery program and the encouragement of the Organization for European Economic Cooperation and the European Payments Union, which have paved the way for greater unity; and

WHEREAS a number of important nations of Europe have demonstrated the sincerity of their desire to attain further unity by initiating such unification programs as the Schuman plan, the Council of Europe, and the European defense community; and

WHEREAS the Foreign Ministers of France, the Federal German Republic, Italy, the Netherlands, Belgium, and Luxemburg declared on December 30, 1951, that the unification of Europe remains one of the essential goals of their Governments; and

WHEREAS it is believed that the realization of this desire would produce a powerful new democratic state, capable of sustaining itself politically, economically, and militarily and able to contribute greatly to the achievement of world peace; and

WHEREAS it is clear that the United States has a profound interest in a strong and free Europe: Now, therefore, be it

Resolved, That it is the sense of the United States Senate that this Government declare its interest in the early creation within the framework of the North Atlantic community of a united states of Europe, or whatever other form of political federation the countries concerned deem most suitable; be it further

Resolved, That it is the sense of the Senate that it would welcome the calling of a European constitutional convention to lay the groundwork for a European political federation at the earliest date possible; and be it further

Resolved, That it is the sense of the Senate that this Government now proclaim its intention of cooperating with any new European federal government that may be brought into being; and finally be it

Resolved That it is the sense of the Senate that the collaboration of a united states of Europe and the United States of America along with the other free nations of the world, dedicated to the same principles, would be one of the greatest contributions of this century to the preservation of freedom and the attainment of peace on earth.

¹ Made in the Senate on Jan. 31 and printed from the *Cong. Rec.* of that date, p. 690.

² S. Res. 269.

Explanation of Authority and Responsibility for IMC

[Released to the press February 7]

Following is the text of a letter from Willard L. Thorp, Assistant Secretary for Economic Affairs, to Senator Ferguson concerning the International Materials Conference:

FEBRUARY 7, 1952

MY DEAR SENATOR FERGUSON: In your speeches in the Senate of January 31¹ and February 4,² you directed certain questions to the Secretary of State concerning the International Materials Conference. The answers to your questions are given below, but first, let me state what the International Materials Conference is and why it was established.

The International Materials Conference (IMC)³ is the collective title applied to 7 autonomous commodity committees, a Central Group, and a Secretariat, which were organized early in 1951, at the initiative of the United States, the United Kingdom, and France. Serious shortages in raw materials and rapidly rising raw material prices were threatening to jeopardize defense production and the struggle against inflation in the countries of the free world. International consultation and action were clearly required. The IMC was established to provide a framework of international consultation in which the major producing and consuming countries of the free world could review the supply and demand position of important commodities, could seek to reach agreement on action to be taken by governments for increased production and more effective conservation and use of the commodities, and could develop agreed measures for equitable distribution of the available supplies.

Your first question was "By what authority in law does the IMC operate?"

The authority for the participation of the United States in this Conference is the authority of the President to negotiate with other countries in furtherance of the foreign policy of the United States. The IMC has no authority to tell any government what it may or may not do with respect to any material. The IMC can only develop agreement among the representatives of countries that they will recommend that their governments take specific action to solve urgent problems. The

governments retain their full right to reject these recommendations. As a matter of fact, the recommendations developed in the IMC have been generally accepted by the participating countries and the nonmember governments.

You also ask "Who decides as to the selection of some commodities and the exclusion of others? Who decides what countries may join?"

The raw materials selected for coverage by the commodity committees were those which in the opinion of the Governments of the United States, United Kingdom, and France required immediate attention because of the widespread need for them and the great apparent shortage. The seven committees then established, and now functioning, are as follows:

Copper, lead and zinc; cotton and cotton linters; manganese, nickel and cobalt; pulp and paper; sulphur; tungsten and molybdenum; and wool.

Not all commodities in short supply were considered suitable for IMC consideration. In some cases existing international machinery was considered adequate. In others, the commodity was limited in its use or production to a very few countries. Some commodities, such as coal, foodstuffs or petroleum, were not subject to serious shortages. Some commodities are so diversified in nature that for practical reasons they could not be considered effectively by a multilateral group.

The Central Group of the IMC was established to decide whether any new committees should be established, to supervise the work of the Secretariat, and to effect such coordination of the commodity committees as might be required. The Central Group originally consisted of representatives of the United States, United Kingdom and France, but the Group was quickly expanded to include representatives of Australia, Brazil, Canada, India, and Italy as well. It also includes one representative each from the Organization of American States and the Organization for European Economic Cooperation. The Central Group has not added any committees to the seven originally established.

The organizational principle which was followed in the commodity committees was that each should be composed of a small enough number of representatives to enable it to work efficiently and effectively, and at the same time a large enough number of countries to give adequate representation to the major producing and consuming inter-

¹ *Cong. Rec.* of Jan. 31, 1952, p. 695.

² *Ibid.*, Feb. 4, 1952, p. 761.

³ *BULLETIN* of July 2, 1951, p. 23.

ests in the commodity concerned. The original selection of the countries was, therefore, based on their statistical position as producers or consumers of the commodities concerned.

The commodity committees have from 11 to 16 members, representing between 80 and 90 percent of the free world production and consumption of the commodities concerned. Each committee has developed its own rules of procedure and has the power to revise its membership. A country may join a committee if it is sponsored by two members and if it receives a favorable vote. There have been several instances of members being added since the establishment of the committees. In all, 28 countries are members of at least one committee.

You ask how *Imc* decisions are made, how countries go about obtaining materials from the *Imc*, what is the appeals procedure, and is each country entitled to one vote.

The first task of an *Imc* committee is to accumulate and review the facts of supply and demand. The committees therefore circulate questionnaires on requirements, production, consumption, and stocks to all countries which are significant producers or consumers. If an examination of the facts in the committees shows a substantial disparity between available supplies and the requirements of the free world for defense and essential civilian purposes, the committees recommend a plan of equitable distribution.

The first programs for sulphur, tungsten, and molybdenum were developed for the third quarter of 1951, and for copper, zinc, nickel, and cobalt beginning in the fourth quarter of 1951. The committees have not made quarterly recommendations for the other commodities. World supply and demand in lead and manganese were judged to be about in balance; cotton and cotton linters, while in short supply last year, are now expected to be much easier; the wool committee did not agree on the scope of the wool shortage nor on steps to alleviate it. The pulp and paper committee dealt with newsprint on an emergency basis to enable the press of various countries in the free world to continue publication in instances where there were extreme shortages of supplies. The total quantity of newsprint on which recommendations have been made by *Imc* is about $\frac{3}{10}$ of 1 percent of world production. This figure is to be compared with the consumption of newsprint by the United States, which is approximately 64 percent of the production in the free world.

Countries which are members of a committee are, of course, active in presenting their own requirements. Countries which are not members of a committee are given the opportunity to appear before the committee and explain their requirements. If a country thinks that the committee has not given proper weight to its requirements, it is entitled to appeal the decision and to ask that the matter be reopened in the committee.

Controversies in the committees are not nor-

mally resolved by voting. In every case the purpose is to reach general agreement, and, if possible, to have unanimous acceptance of a committee recommendation. Since no country has delegated any authority to the *Imc*, it would clearly be impossible to accomplish effective collaboration on the distribution of an item in short supply if any important country concerned was not disposed to cooperate and to consider the committee recommendations to be of service to its own interests.

The results of the work of the *Imc* are given full publicity, and regular information bulletins are used to advise the public of the progress of committee work. Special announcements of quarterly recommendations are issued.

The basic principle in domestic allocation of scarce materials is an equitable distribution in accordance with essentiality of need, giving first priority to the defense effort. The international policy of the United States has the same objective and the same criteria. It is this general principle which has guided the United States in its actions in the *Imc*.

The chief U.S. delegate to the *Imc* is an official of the Defense Production Administration (*DPA*). He is responsible for determination of the position of the United States with respect to any question before the *Imc* committees. In developing this position, he receives the advice of all interested agencies, including the Department of State among others.

The U.S. delegates to the individual commodity committees come from a number of agencies. They are selected on the basis of their qualifications for conducting the negotiations and for their knowledge and background in the specific commodity. They receive their instructions from the *DPA*, and they are answerable to the *DPA* for the results of their negotiations. Formal action by the Government of the United States in accepting a recommendation of the *Imc* committee is taken by the *DPA*, with the advice of the interested agencies. In each case in which a proposal for distribution has been accepted by the United States, the supply authorities have been satisfied that the share received by the United States has been fair.

You have inquired concerning consultation with consuming industries in the United States, and have made a number of comments on the relationship of *Imc* allocations to domestic needs. I understand that Manly Fleischmann, Administrator of the Defense Production Administration, has covered most of these points in his press conference of February 6.

I believe that the above answers cover your questions, except those concerning the domestic situation to which it is more appropriate for Mr. Fleischmann to reply. However, I should like to add a word about the significance of the *Imc* to the conduct of our international relations. In a period of commodity shortages, difficult and delicate problems arise between the United States and

other countries, both with respect to our obtaining from foreign sources our appropriate share of those materials of which our supply is inadequate, and in determining the extent to which we should permit the continuation of the export to particular foreign destinations of materials which we control. It is greatly to our interest to achieve the most effective international distribution and use of these commodities, for the support and defense and essential civilian activity. The existence of a forum in which these commodity problems can be discussed by the major producers and consumers of each, is of tremendous value. Each country becomes aware of the problems faced by other countries, is encouraged to accept its share of the burdens resulting from the shortages, and to seek constructive ways of increasing available supplies. Although it cannot be expected to eliminate the existence of shortages, the Imc has proved to be a means of bringing into a world situation, which threatened to be a source of international ill-will, a form of international collaboration which has led to the substantial satisfaction of all countries concerned.

In view of the public nature of the discussion of this subject, the Department is making this letter available to the press after you have received it.

Sincerely yours,

WILLARD L. THORP
Assistant Secretary

Further Emergency Allocation Of Newsprint

The Pulp-Paper Committee of the International Materials Conference on January 25 announced a further emergency allocation of newsprint.

In the emergency allocation announced, the fourth of its kind, the Committee recommended the shipment of 6,150 metric tons of newsprint to the following countries:

	Metric tons
Ecuador	500
Germany, Federal Republic of	2,000
Israel	400
Spain	750
Turkey	500
Yugoslavia	2,000
Total	6,150

In the three previous allocations, a total of 27,500 metric tons of newsprint were allocated to 15 countries in special need. Today's action brings the Committee's total tonnage of emergency allocations to 33,650 metric tons to 18 countries. Ecuador, Israel, and Turkey are being assisted for the first time.

The total amounts allocated to date are as follows:

	Metric tons
Brazil	1,200
Chile	1,000
Dominican Republic	500
Ecuador	500
France	4,700
Germany, Federal Republic of	7,000
Greece	1,440
India	2,250
Indonesia	1,500
Israel	400
Malaya and Singapore	630
Nicaragua	400
Pakistan	450
Philippines	2,340
Spain	1,750
Turkey	500
Uruguay	1,200
Yugoslavia	5,890
Total	33,650

The newsprint allocated is from North American sources.

The Committee has received reports from the countries concerned on the status of shipments against the previous allocations and has found that all tonages allocated have been shipped except some purchased by a few countries to whom deliveries are now being completed.

The Committee has been considering for some time and has agreed upon plans for a broader newsprint program for 1952 which would center upon encouraging trade in newsprint through normal commercial transactions. The 1952 over-all newsprint situation will be reviewed in February on the basis of new statistical returns requested from all countries of the free world concerning their production and requirements. After these data have been studied, the Committee will embark upon the broader newsprint program if such action is warranted.

The objectives of the broader program now contemplated would be to recommend again strictly limited emergency assistance to countries in special need and concurrently, by special measures, to encourage also the resumption of newsprint trade between producers and foreign publishers through commercial channels. The Committee does not, however, contemplate a plan involving general allocation of world newsprint supplies. The tonnage likely to become available under such a combined program would be limited. Thus it would still be necessary for all countries to do their utmost to secure their full requirements through usual commercial channels without relying upon assistance from the Committee.

The Pulp-Paper Committee reported also that Canada has reserved the right to consider a price policy, for the present and future allocations, which would result in newsprint prices closer to levels prevailing in the recipient countries. This policy recognizes the need to eliminate claims for assistance which in some cases may be based solely on considerations of price rather than supply.

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